You are NEVER hooked in.

General discussion about the sport of hang gliding
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Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=64159
Camera On, Pilot Not
Doug Marley - 2021/01/02 16:33:59 UTC

It's very sad that the guy standing on the aft-port (4 oclock) position of the PIC was just whistling Dixie rather than paying attention to what the situation was directly in front of him.

We almost had a similar situation involving a H-5 pilot about to launch. Thankfully [someone] was a bit more attentive to my brother-in-flight's poor situation. His side flying wire was kinked around the LE tang as a result of a poor (or non-existent) pre-flight. While he was waiting for a good cycle off the mountain launch, I did him the favor of doing quick pre-flight like I do with everyone else when I'm not busy with my own gear. At the very last second I found the kink just as he was uttering "CLEAR!". I loudly exclaimed "ABORT!!" before he acted on his decision.
I don't know if the kink would have terminally fatigued and put him into a near-vertical trajectory at some point in his flight, but at least he had some confidence that his good brothers had his six.
I am always amazed at pilots that merely stand around the launch, thoroughly entranced and enchanted by the vista without observing the life and death actions that are being acted upon right in front of their noses. So many of them stand about acting like wufo-zombies.

When I'm on launch assisting or merely observing another pilot launching, the very first thing I look for is the hang loop and it's attachments. Then I consciously move my eyes over the craft in a similar manner to my own pre-flight check, but at a physical position that doesn't hinder the PIC's operation. If something appears even slightly amiss, I move in for a closer look to verify and immediately notify the PIC of my concern. Once in a while I find something that doesn't look correct from ten feet away, but upon closer inspection it is verified as proper. Sometimes the PIC has a disgusted look on his face for someone interrupting his concentration, but at least he has a bit more piece of mind.

I wonder if people don't alert others to possible follies merely because they believe it wouldn't be PC or they are too timid and unsure of themselves? To hell with that PC logic. And grow some balls, otherwise you shouldn't be on launch.

I'm not trying to be holier than thou, but it really pisses me off to see wufo-zombie-pilots not actively participating in the life-or-death matters at the most extreme moments of the flights of their brothers and sisters.
It's very sad that the guy standing on the aft-port (4 oclock) position...
Yeah?

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Aft port? Wouldn't that be seven or eight o'clock? In the Northern Hemisphere anyway?
...of the PIC...
The PILOT in COMMAND?

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I'm afraid I'm having some serious issues with your terminology already.
...was just whistling Dixie rather than paying attention to what the situation was directly in front of him.
Yeah, the vision of all the other guys watching that launch attempt was so crappy that they'd have had close to zilch chances to detect the problem in a timely manner. So let's single out this individual. (Any comments on what actually happened (not the Mark G. Forbes perspective) at Whitwell on 2005/10/01?
We almost had a similar situation involving a H-5 pilot about to launch.
Speaking of H-5 "pilots"... Any comment on Kelly Harrison and all the assholes who trained, rated, certified him? Our buddy on this one was only endangering himself.
Thankfully [someone] was a bit more attentive to my brother-in-flight's poor situation. His side flying wire was kinked around the LE tang as a result of a poor (or non-existent) pre-flight. While he was waiting for a good cycle off the mountain launch, I did him the favor of doing quick pre-flight like I do with everyone else when I'm not busy with my own gear. At the very last second I found the kink just as he was uttering "CLEAR!". I loudly exclaimed "ABORT!!" before he acted on his decision.
Great job, Doug. Now tell us just how much less dead our brother-in-flight Rafi Lavin would've ended up with the benefit of all your attentiveness. This guy's cable was obviously fucked up but likely WOULDN'T have blown on that flight. At two G's they're not seeing all that much load. Rafi's wire LOOKED pristine but failed and killed him within a few seconds of launch. The problem was that it wasn't load tested as THE most critical of preflight procedures.

People AREN'T doing them and WON'T do them. So as far as I'm concerned your efforts on that issue are majorly misplaced and wastes of time.
I don't know if the kink would have terminally fatigued and put him into a near-vertical trajectory at some point in his flight...
The reduced positive dihedral and asymmetry would've affected handling and probably gotten his attention. And at that point he'd very likely been able to deal with the situation.
...but at least he had some confidence that his good brothers had his six.
1. Fuck his good brothers.
2. Also fuck his confidence. That's what got him to the point of a second and a half shy of commitment in the first place.
I am always amazed at pilots that merely stand around the launch...
http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=24846
Is this a joke ?
Jim Rooney - 2011/08/25 04:55:25 UTC

It always amazes to hear know it all pilots arguing with the professional pilots.
I mean seriously, this is our job.
...thoroughly entranced and enchanted by the vista...
Yeah, those guys were all thoroughly entranced and enchanted by the vista. That's EXACTLY what was going on. Great call, Doug.
...without observing the life and death actions that are being acted upon right in front of their noses. So many of them stand about acting like wufo-zombies.
Get fucked. "Wuffo-zombie" is oxymoronic - not to mention multiple other forms of moronic.

- A "wuffo" (What for this?) is an individual interested in what we're doing and asking questions about it. And to denigrate such individuals as annoying assholes who should back the fuck off and watch... Don't worry, Doug. We're bringing in more new pilots than we can deal with times five as it is.

- Zombies? If you really want zombies go to an AT operation and watch all the guys launching with easily reachable bent pin barrel releases and Standard Aerotow Weak Links.
When I'm on launch assisting or merely observing another pilot launching, the very first thing I look for is the hang loop and it's attachments. Then I consciously move my eyes over the craft in a similar manner to my own pre-flight check, but at a physical position that doesn't hinder the PIC's operation. If something appears even slightly amiss, I move in for a closer look to verify and immediately notify the PIC of my concern. Once in a while I find something that doesn't look correct from ten feet away, but upon closer inspection it is verified as proper.
Tell us about something you've actually found - beyond the sidewire - that's actually mattered. And would you count a...

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...basetube minus skids or wheels as a problem? Wanna take a guess as to how many arms have been broken and necks have been snapped as consequences of those?
Sometimes the PIC has a disgusted look on his face for someone interrupting his concentration...
Concentration... Absolutely critical to the truly...

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...focused pilot.
...but at least he has a bit more piece of mind.
Two or three more pieces and he should be good to go.
I wonder if people don't alert others to possible follies merely because they believe it wouldn't be PC...
Yeah, that was the problem. All those guys at the Pyeongchang noticed the empty hang strap but were too cowed by all this rampant political correctness fanaticism to point out the issue. "Hey kid, doesn't look like you're hooked in." "FUCK YOU - you RACIST PIECE O' SHIT!!!"
...or they are too timid and unsure of themselves?
Keep babbling incoherently and incessantly. It's The Davis Show - nobody will call you on any of it.
To hell with that PC logic.
Yeah, ditto for all that fraudulent voting.
And grow some balls, otherwise you shouldn't be on launch.
Nah, you have enough logic and balls for all of us.
I'm not trying to be holier than thou...
Course not. You blew by that milestone ages ago.
...but it really pisses me off to see wufo-zombie-pilots not actively participating in the life-or-death matters at the most extreme moments of the flights of their brothers and sisters.
We need so many more like you. But it just ain't gonna happen at the level needed to make this game sustainable.
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Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

Something of a continuation from:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post12249.html#p12249
Joe Gregor - 2006/01

SUMMARY REPORT:
2005/10/01 / approximately 14:00
Whitwell, Tennessee
52-year-old male, H-3
Wills Wing Sport 2
High Energy Tracer
Charlie Insider
SSE at 5-7 mph; nearly straight in and smooth

A new intermediate rated pilot participating in his first hang gliding competition launched from a modified cliff-launch site and became separated from the glider seconds after launching. The pilot fell approximately 300 feet into mature hardwoods and died immediately due to severe blunt-force trauma. Witnesses state that the pilot was asked by several people just prior to launching if he needed a hang check, and he responded in the negative.

Conditions: The accident flight was initiated from a SE-facing cliff-launch site. Winds were SSE at 5-7, essentially straight in and light.

Logbook: The accident pilot held a USHGA H-3 rating (obtained in March, 2005) with the following special skill signoffs: AT, FL, PL, ST, and TURB. Detailed logbook information is not available, but still the vast majority of his time and training had been obtained via aerotow. The accident pilot had reportedly just discovered mountain flying, having logged roughly 12 flights at four different sites.

Medical: There were no known preexisting physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight. The accident pilot appeared to be in good spirits, although a bit nervous as it was his first hang gliding competition.

Synopsis: The accident pilot - who was reportedly eager to get into the air - carried his glider to the launch point and set it down tail to the wind. He walked out to launch to look at conditions and was told they were fine. At this point no one had yet launched. A call for wind dummies was made, and the meet director was assessing conditions while awaiting volunteer non-competition pilots to arrive and perform the first launches. The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously. At least one witness stated that the accident pilot appeared a bit nervous both in this situation and before, while setting up his glider. When he went to his glider to get ready, one pilot who had been talking with him said, "Be sure to do a hang check." The accident pilot spent some time under his glider while it was turned around. He then lifted it, turned 180 degrees to face the ramp, and was met by a side wire crew. At this point his team leader told the accident pilot, "Do a hang check." The wire crewman on the right side reported that, after subsequently setting the glider down, the accident pilot started adjusting his VG rope and talking to the crew about how to give him feedback.

The accident pilot picked up his glider and proceeded to the launch point. Several pilots present at the scene reported they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in. Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were four or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?" In no case was it reported that he responded directly.

Conditions were pronounced fine and the accident pilot cleared his launch. He launched using the grapevine grip and the glider dove as soon as he put weight on it. Two videos of the launch clearly show that he rotated his hands to the beer-bottle grip as soon as he started running and the glider lifted.

The glider disappeared from view but soon reappeared going nearly straight up, reached an apex, stalled, yawed to the side, and went back down nearly vertically. Witness reports and later review of two videos taken of the launch indicate that the accident pilot had lost his grip on the glider as soon as it began pulling out from the dive. He was carried on a trajectory that sent him past the trees below launch and it was estimated that he fell approximately 300 feet. He died upon impact.

Airframe: Damage to the glider is consistent with mild impact and recovery from a tree landing. Hang strap and carabiner were both found in good condition and disconnected from one another. The parachute, a PDA-22 manufactured by Free Flight, was found in good condition still inside the deployment bag.

Analysis: No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis in this accident. As a result we are left with eyewitness accounts and post-crash damage analysis in order to determine what likely occurred in this accident. Sadly, the probable cause in this incident seems relatively certain.

A post incident continuity check was performed on the accident pilot's harness and glider. The glider hang strap and the carabiner were both found intact with no sign of stress. A photograph, taken just before the accident pilot launched, showed that the carabiner was actually clipped to the pilot's harness under his arm. The accident pilot was flying a Sport 2 glider with a High Energy harness. The normal white Wills Wing hang strap is a non-standard length. As a result, he had a black extension strap hooked to his glider's hang strap. The black extension strap was long enough and of the proper color to make it appear, upon a cursory inspection, that the pilot was actually attached to his wing. The black colored carabiner did not stand out against the dark colored harness and could have easily been overlooked. Several pilots reported seeing him hooked in, indicating that they had mistaken the black extension strap for his harness main strap.

The accident pilot had experienced a failure-to-hook-in event two weeks prior to this accident while attempting flight from a local ramp-launch site. He was challenged at launch by another pilot who, grabbing his nose wires, saw that the accident pilot wasn't hooked in and said: "Do you want a hang check?" The accident pilot refused this and three additional increasingly emphatic offers to perform a hang check before he was told to examine his carabiner, to discover that he was not yet hooked into his glider. The accident pilot never made comment on this incident at any time after his successful ridge-soaring flight.

Probable Cause: Failure to hook into the glider prior to launch. Failure to complete a full and complete hang check just prior to launching.

Discussion: Launching is one of the most dangerous phases of flight for a hang glider pilot. This is doubly true if the glider is mis-assembled prior to flight. For a hang glider, the harness serves the same function as the cockpit and fuselage of a conventional aircraft. Ensuring that the glider is airworthy requires a preflight check that cannot be completely performed while the glider is still partially assembled. Until the harness is attached to the wing, the glider is still only partially assembled. Performing a final hang check just prior to flight is the only way to ensure that the glider is completely assembled and airworthy. The final hang check must therefore be performed meticulously and religiously. Pilots who, for whatever reason, delay assembly or partially disassemble their glider (unhooking and remaining in the harness) while waiting at launch are at increased risk for launching a non-airworthy aircraft.

Having and maintaining a strict routine is of extreme importance to any pilot. The accident pilot may have been nervous due to his inexperience with mountain launches and his relative lack of competition experience. The latter is an important point because competition has a tendency to increase the tension and the distraction level (even though this was a low key "fun" meet.) Additionally this was a new site to this pilot, and he was flying with some new and less-than-familiar electronic equipment. All of these factors can serve to break a pilot's routine. Pilots flying under conditions that break their normal routine must exercise vigilance to ensure that all required checks are successfully completed prior to flight.

The accident pilot had trained and flown primarily via aerotow. He was relatively new to mountain flying and his background may have been a factor in this accident. The routine developed for performing a pre-flight safety check is different when launching from a dolly via aerotow vs. launching from a mountain site - increasing the potential for the pilot to make a serious oversight impacting safety of flight. Pilots experienced and confident in one launch method or maneuver should be cognizant of the fact that their skills and abilities may not be at the same level when performing a new launch method or maneuver.

Recommendation: Always perform a full and complete hang check just prior to launching. Pilots should make full use of their wire crew, when available, to assist in evaluating their aircraft (glider and harness) for airworthiness prior to launching.

Techniques, such as the so-called "Aussie technique" of completely assembling the glider before pre-flight and not removing the harness until flight is complete, can be used to eliminate one common failure mode - that of unhooking from the glider and failing to properly hook back in prior to launching.

Another technique that can be used to eliminate critical errors is the religious use of checklists and standardized procedures. Over the century-long course of manned-aviation history, maintaining a strict routine and standardized procedure has proven a potent safety multiplier. Hang glider pilots experience a much wider range of conditions during take-off, approach, and landing than do most pilots of conventional aircraft. Additionally, the individualist nature of our sport does not lend well to efforts at standardization. This puts hang glider pilots at significantly increased risk compared to their fixed-wing brethren, and this risk must be managed intelligently and professionally. Since our aircraft are so simple, use of a written checklist has proven unnecessary for most pilots. This, unfortunately, makes us vulnerable to making critical omissions when conditions cause a break in our individual routine. Alarm bells should go off in our heads when we note a break in our routine. One way to manage this risk is to limit changes to equipment, flying sites, venue, and flying tasks to one element at a time. If you decide to fly a new site, for instance, avoid doing so with a brand-new harness or wing.

One important technique for managing risk at launch is to always make efficient use of any available ground crew. The pilot in command bears sole responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight. Thus, performing a full and complete hang check just prior to flight is the sole responsibility of the pilot in command. In discharging this responsibility, pilots should make maximum use of available ground crew to help ensure that whatever checks they routinely perform have been successfully completed prior to flight.

Recommendation: Event organizers should encourage all pilots involved in an event to demonstrate that their aircraft is airworthy just prior to flight as a condition for launching during the event.

While the pilot in command bears sole responsibility for performing all required checks, accurately judging conditions, and conducting a safe flight, it behooves everyone to do what they can to help fellow pilots achieve these goals. The wide range of operating conditions and flying equipment, the self-imposed lack of standardized operating practices, and the understandable pre-occupation we all have ensuring the safe conduct of our own flight, makes this an extremely difficult task for the community. Organized events, however, provide a more controlled and constrained environment, one where procedures could be implemented that would significantly enhance safety. While several people reportedly challenged the pilot to confirm that he had performed a hang check, and had glanced at his equipment to see if everything looked OK, no one demanded to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch. Had such a demand been made, and the accident pilot complied, this accident would never have occurred.

Photos: Dean Funk
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C.J. Sturtevant

A previous Master's Tips column by Rob Kells (page 56 in last month's issue) also addresses dealing with distractions during pre-flight, and offers suggestions on how to ensure that pilot and glider are firmly connected before committing aviation. It's worth rereading.
How come you don't show them this:

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launch photo? Too horrifying for a family publication?
A new intermediate rated pilot participating in his first hang gliding competition...
- And our first misrepresentation. Don't worry, Joe. Plenty of room left for more. No, he was about to serve as a wind dummy. It's a real stretch to say that that constitutes participating in a comp. More akin to a Turkey Vulture (what hang glider people refer to as a "bird") that had happened to cruise by out in front at about that time.

- So who rated him? u$hPa has an "Instructor of the Year" award program to recognize the best of the best. How come we never get told anything about the signatures on the rating cards of the stars of your fatality reports? Afraid we might start detecting patterns you don't want us to detect?
...launched from a modified cliff-launch site and became separated from the glider seconds after launching.
- How can one become separated from something to which one was never connected in the first place? Are we wording it this way to help shield the launch crew from charges of culpability?

- See? The Turkey Vulture would've worked a lot better. And they wouldn't have had to recover what was left of Bill and his minorly damaged glider (from quite separate locations) and scrub the first day.

- This is a garden variety unhooked launch incident that just happened to occur at an extremely unforgiving mountain site. We've had them since the beginning of time, our training programs have never done shit to effectively address the issue, they're common as dirt, why is it that this one needs a book in the way of an incident report? Whether it's off a vertical cliff and results in a three hundred foot plummet or on a shallow dune with barely noticeable consequences it's the same mistake. If this fatal plummet needs a book then so does the one that was noticed and rectified in the space of fifteen seconds.

Oh right, this one's all about ass covering, politics, pretending to do something of actual value. Pray continue.
The pilot...
The PILOT? He never even made it to passenger status.
...fell approximately 300 feet into mature hardwoods...
Pity they weren't immature hardwoods. Immature hardwoods will flex a lot more - give one a fighting chance.
...and died immediately due to severe blunt-force trauma.
- Are we're absolutely POSITIVE that the butler didn't do it and rig things to make it look like an accident?

- We're not allowed to say that anymore. It was found to be much more effective if we report that the pilot "suffered fatal injuries". There's no suffering involved in dying immediately due to severe blunt-force trauma so people don't take those reports as seriously.
Witnesses state that the pilot was asked by several people just prior to launching if he needed a hang check, and he responded in the negative.
- Bullshit. Regardless of whether you're talking about a hang glider, Cessna, F/A-18, 747, Space Shuttle "just prior to launching" means SECONDS in the low single digit range. And that also means from launch position - obviously. We have NO REPORT that anybody communicated anything to anyone about his connection status subsequent to some unspecified point in his approach to launch position. And in approaches to ramps there are damn good reasons for pilots to NOT be connected to their gliders. At Glacier and Makapu'u hooked in approaches aren't permitted or done. And nobody's ever launched unhooked from either of those sites.

- That was one thing he got right that day. The only people who come anywhere close to needing hang checks are the ones about to fly new harness/glider configurations.

- Witnesses state that? Sounds like the several people who asked him just prior to launching if he needed a hang check weren't all that keen to acknowledge that they hadn't looked to see whether or not he was actually hooked in.

- A hang check can't be done just prior to launching. A hook-in check can be done just prior to and often as the pilot's launching.
Logbook: The accident pilot held a USHGA H-3 rating (obtained in March, 2005) with the following special skill signoffs: AT, FL, PL, ST, and TURB.
- By whom? Shouldn't we know the identity of his instructor(s) and/or ratings official(s) so's we can pay all the appropriate compliments? I guess the fact that the motherfucker has never published a single word on this one anywhere on any medium tells us everything we really need to know.

- Wasn't this guy's instructor also the instructor who trained and signed off the Three who was half killed in similar nothing conditions at his operation on an AT launch effort eighteen weeks prior? u$hPa's 2004 Instructor of the Year? Maybe we should do some serious thinking about selecting him again for 2005 to make it blindingly clear to all the stupid muppets out there that there's absolutely no correlation between quality of hang gliding instruction and the survival rates of those signed off for various ratings and skills. Then maybe another article explaining exactly what a rating's supposed to qualify us to do.

- Where's the CL rating? Whitwell requires a Three with Cliff Launch. If he didn't have one then fine. An Observer could've signed him off for the one he was about to do. And it's hard to imagine a more appropriate launch site than Whitwell for that one. And any competent Observer would've caught the empty hang strap. And if the Observer HADN'T caught the empty hang strap then he'd have been almost as screwed as Steve Parson and Jon Orders were. Not to mention u$hPa.
Detailed logbook information is not available...
- Really? You just told us:
Logbook:
You just saw his bare bones logbook but the detailed one he'd left at home and u$hPa was never able to obtain access? From his sister's posting on the Capitol Club rag I'da thunk that the family would've wanted it fully available.

- Why not? Bill's buddies packed up all his gear and personal items for the sad trip back north. A log isn't a personal diary whose contents are considered private. It's a supposed to be documentation of the pilot's flying experience and intended to present to anyone who asked. In conventional aviation it's documentation of experience and currency for ratings and licensing. In hang gliding it's supposed to be the same. Bill would've been racking up hours to qualify for a Four at this point.

And it's pretty clear that two weekends prior Bill was approaching the south ramp at McConnellsburg unhooked, assuming he wasn't, and intending to launch. If that had been documented and checked it could have defused this situation. And if it hadn't been documented that would've told us something about how well our system's working.
...but still the vast majority of his time and training had been obtained via aerotow.
- Manquin right? Max elevation: 58 feet MSL. Min elevation 54 feet MSL. Whitwell: Launch: 2115 MSL, LZ: 740 MSL. Pity Steve couldn't be bothered to chime in on this one, give us a little more background.

- Do we have any information on whether or not Bill had successfully completed the short clinic Steve offers to qualify AT pilots to go up pro toad? I would assume so because a Three qualifies one to participate in u$hPa Nationals comps, Davis only permits competitors to fly with appropriate bridles and weak links, and no two point bridle has ever been qualified as appropriate.

- AT huh? So immediately prior to launch - not to mention during - your suspension is fully loaded so an unhooked launch is a physical impossibility. Not much relevant to learn from that environment then.

- So who cleared him for hill, mountain, ramp, cliff launch environments and what do we know about the relevant training? No, wait! There's no detailed logbook information available so we have absolutely no way of knowing or learning anything from that front. DAMN!
The accident pilot had reportedly just discovered mountain flying, having logged roughly 12 flights at four different sites.
- He just DISCOVERED it? All by himself? And here I was thinking that u$hPa pilots were supposed to be trained, mentored, guided along as they advanced from the early dunes, training hill, scooter stuff.

- Really hard to believe that he DISCOVERED mountain flying - at some point in 2005 I'd guess. I'd been under the impression that people had been flying mountains pretty regularly since the early Seventies on.

- Had he just "discovered" aerotowing the way he discovered mountain flying? Or was there a more formal process involved?

- Everybody and his dog knows that towing is hundreds of times more dangerous than mountain flying - due to all the extreme complexity involved. Funny the way he seems to have survived all the flatland stuff minus a single reported scratch but gets extremely terminally splattered before pulling off much more than a dozen mountain launches. Any thoughts on that?

- And I guess it would be way to much trouble to tell us what those sites were. I have him:
-- 2005/07/03 - Hyner
-- 2005/07/04 - Jacks
-- 2005/09/17-18 - McConnellsburg
Woodstock would be a good bet for the other one.
Medical: There were no known preexisting physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight.
- How 'bout afterwards?

- Good thing you pointed that out for us, Joe. In just about all every unhooked launch incident I've read about there was a preexisting physical condition or illness prior to the accident flight which was found to be a major contributing factor at a minimum. And way more often than not the smoking gun. Poor depth perception is almost always a biggie.
The accident pilot appeared to be in good spirits, although a bit nervous as it was his first hang gliding competition.
- He wasn't in the competition. What was he supposed to have been nervous about? And given that it was noticed that he was nervous, pretty new to mountain flying, shouldn't someone not terribly pressed for time have checked him out and stayed with him for the three or four minutes it would've taken to get him safely airborne?

- Pity nobody else in that total clusterfuck of an operation was the slightest bit nervous about the first launch of the event being attempted by a nervous low mountain time new Three without a Cliff Launch rating.
Synopsis: The accident pilot - who was reportedly eager to get into the air - carried his glider to the launch point and set it down tail to the wind. He walked out to launch to look at conditions and was told they were fine.
- Cliff launch. SSE at 5-7 mph; nearly straight in and smooth. Did he really need to be told the conditions were fine?

- Did anybody remind him that he was about to run off a cliff and needed to be absolutely certain he was connected to his glider immediately prior? Did anybody advise him to stand close to the edge, look down, think about what the consequences of an unhooked launch would likely be?

- Scratch that. What he really needed to be absolutely certain of was that he WASN'T connected to his glider - regardless of whether or not he actually wasn't.

http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=13132
Unhooked Death Again - Change our Methods Now?
Quinn Cornwell - 2009/01/24 19:57:03 UTC
HPAC Accident Review and Safety Committee Chairman

No, don't think about the jagged boulders. That'll mess with your head. Don't ever tell pilots to think about "Oh, if you screw this up, you'll crash and burn into those jagged rocks down there, so make sure you don't screw this up." This sort of psychology is detrimental. It's good to be conscience of the dangers in hang gliding, pointing this out right before you start running is just plain stupid.
Don't worry, Quinn. Nobody messed with his head and his launch was confident, flawless, textbook. He died only because of an issue related to assembly and preflight - absolutely nothing to do with his physical execution of the task.
At this point no one had yet launched. A call for wind dummies was made...
- Presumably by an individual involved in the running of the comp. Care to tell us who?
...and the meet director was assessing conditions...
...from way back behind launch where he would've had no chance to spot an unhooked launch situation about to erupt. But if that hadn't happened he'd have done a great job in assessing the conditions safe for launch and likely soarable.
...while awaiting volunteer non-competition pilots to arrive and perform the first launches.
So much for Bill - this was his first competition.
The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously.
- Good job. Ya just never know when your hook knife is gonna be a critical issue.

- I wonder how things might have gone if we'd have made him leave his parachute, hook knife, etc. back at Henson. Maybe he'd have gotten bored and started thinking about other issues.
At least one witness stated that the accident pilot appeared a bit nervous both in this situation and before, while setting up his glider.
Pity nobody else was - with respect to what would be the first - and last - launch of the day.
When he went to his glider to get ready, one pilot who had been talking with him said...
"I'm pretty well prepped and you're about to wind dummy. I'll stick with you, help wire you into position, make sure you get off OK. OK?" Just kidding.
..."Be sure to do a hang check."
Why? IS that a u$hPa SOP or was it a mandatory meet protocol? Why are individuals telling him this? Surely the Meet Head called all the participants - competitors and wind dummies - together for a proper briefing well prior to any possibility of any launches.
After your glider's fully assembled and preflighted move it and your harness to the staging area. Wind dummies first. Mike here - everybody see Mike? - will be today's launch director. After you're hooked in and ready to go he'll give a final check thirty feet behind launch and serve as your port wire crewman. Conditions are currently pretty mellow but if/as shit starts cycling we'll recruit volunteers for starboard.

And note that we'll actually be complying with u$hPa's quarter century old hook-in check mandate. And no, that doesn't mean a hang check. If you need to check your bar clearance do it in the staging area. And if you need to do it and have forgotten to it you'll be sent back to the staging area so you don't hold up the pilots who've managed to make it that far with their shit together.

Any questions? Good. Wind dummy launch window opens in fifteen minutes.
So how come that didn't happen? And how come you're conspicuously not reporting that that didn't happen? And let's say that the launch wouldn't have been a 100.00 percent death sentence like Whitwell or Henson. Let's say that it was something like:

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That still gums up the works, takes a glider out of commission probably for the duration, wrecks someone's experience, provides a point of negative publicity.
The accident pilot spent some time under his glider while it was turned around. He then lifted it...
How high? If you lift it a few extra inches you can find out whether or not you're connected and have your leg loops. How come NOT ONCE in this shit heap of an "accident" report do you make that point?
...turned 180 degrees to face the ramp, and was met by a side wire crew.
A SIDE wire crew? Cliff launch, SSE at 5-7... Where else would we have put crew?
At this point his team leader...
He was a wind dummy. Tell me how he had a team leader. And as a wind dummy he should've been under the control of / reporting to the Meet Head and flying for the equal benefit of all teams and individual competitors. And the Meet Head should've announced to all the regular participants, teams, team leaders that the dummy would shortly be launching so that anybody interested could observe the launch and get a feel for what the air was doing. Duh.
...told the accident pilot, "Do a hang check."
- Who was "his team leader"? Shouldn't he be publicly recognized so we can all thank him for the stellar job he did in almost preventing this unhooked launch fatality?

- How 'bout the conspicuously unidentified Meet Head? (Dean Funk) Or is everybody just supposed to do whatever some other meet participant tells him to?

- So the "side wire crew" obviously also heard the accident pilot's team leader telling him, "Do a hang check." and clearly observed the accident pilot NOT do a hang check and didn't bother to look to see whether or not...

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...he was actually connected to his fucking glider. And I wonder why NOTHING has been said about the qualifications of the "side wire crew" - which was obviously two individuals in these conditions. Also so reported by Scott.

They're taking on responsibility for the safety of the launch. They aid the (presumed) pilot to keep the glider level and pointed into the wind and need to be able to let go on command and not reconnect inappropriately. And they were clearly in excellent positions to visually assess Bill's connection status while Bill himself had zilch of same.

But do continue telling us NOTHING about the qualifications of any of the total incompetent bozos running this horror show. We'd much rather hear descriptions of the trees through which he plummeted on the slope three hundred feet below launch. Maybe a paragraph or two on the best forest management strategies for mitigating the consequences of unhooked launches.

- This:

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC

We visited Steve Wendt yesterday, who was visibly choked up over Bill's death. For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
is about everything we ever got - indirectly - from Bill's exceptionally knowledgeable ace instructor. Doesn't say anything about a hang check. Says you've got to hook in - period. And nobody's who's hooked in has ever launched unhooked, right Joe? And even fewer individuals who've hooked in AND done a hang check have ever launched unhooked. The record's crystal clear on this.
The accident pilot picked up his glider and proceeded to the launch point. Several pilots present at the scene reported they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in.
- Oh really. The Sport 2 uses kingpost suspension. So tell me how one can check the "hang point" and reach a conclusion that the prospective pilot is probably hooked in. 'Specially with suspension we know was never for a single millisecond under an ounce of tension.

Tell me how, even if the suspension had been conventional direct-to-the-keel, one could look at the hang point and come away with enhanced confidence that the pilot was hooked in.

The only way anyone can gain some confidence that ANYONE is hooked in at ANY moment his to check the CARABINER. And since that's a device that only about five or ten percent of the hang gliding population can even spell correctly I'm not seeing much hope there.

And...

- Seeing the carabiner properly connected while the pilot is prepping for launch should imbue one with ZERO confidence that the carabiner will be connected at the moment of launch.

- A properly connected carabiner may be of ZERO use to the pilot if he hasn't made it through at least one leg loop.

- If you have a shitload of "pilots" present at the scene reporting that they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in then you have a serious competence problem and should scrub the meet and all further flying till at least next spring after you've gotten people properly qualified to fly hang gliders.

- I guess the several pilots present at the scene also reported that they checked his hang point and it looked like Bill's carabiner was locked - 'cause we all know how obsessive idiot hang glider people are about that issue.
Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were for or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?" In no case was it reported that he responded directly.
- Sounds like everybody 'cept Bill went above and beyond the call of duty to ensure this launch would go off as safely and smoothly as humanly possible.

- And if he'd said, "Yep, taken care of two minutes ago. I NEVER pick up a hang glider and start moving to launch before I've done a hang check." then everything would've been fine and we wouldn't all be sitting here reading this bullshit report. We could've used this magazine space for a discussion of the best material and knots to use to construct a really consistent aerotow weak link - one that meets our expectation of failing as needed to protect the equipment, not failing inadvertently or inconsistently. A weak link that will break as early as possible in lockout situations, but be strong and reliable enough to avoid frequent breaks from turbulence. (Somehow managed to miss your comments on that article, Joe.)

- OK, all these individual nobody participants are all hyper about Bill getting his stupid hang check. So how come the Meet Head didn't designate a staging point immediately behind launch at which a hang check would be mandatory? There might even be a case to be made for something like that given that individuals might be using new, swapped, borrowed equipment so it wouldn't hurt to check clearances. And maybe they'd find people hanging a bit high or low and be able to make recommendations and effect adjustments.
The glider disappeared from view but soon reappeared going nearly straight up, reached an apex, stalled, yawed to the side, and went back down nearly vertically.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2mX2HNwVr9g
Hang Gliding Fail
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He was carried on a trajectory that sent him past the trees below launch and it was estimated that he fell approximately 300 feet. He died upon impact.
Good thing he had a backup loop. I shudder to think how things would've almost certainly ended otherwise.
No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis in this accident.
Guess we'll never really be able to understand what happened and why then.
As a result we are left with eyewitness accounts and post-crash damage analysis in order to determine what likely occurred in this accident.
Thank God. I'm at a total loss at this point.
As a result, he had a black extension strap hooked to his glider's hang strap. The black extension strap was long enough and of the proper color to make it appear, upon a cursory inspection, that the pilot was actually attached to his wing.
- What a bitch. Normally cursory inspections of our gear do just fine - sidewires for example.

- They saw an untensioned white factory hang strap with nothing obvious connected to it and were satisfied that he was safely and securely attached to his glider. Yeah, that sorta configuration would've totally baffled all but the very best of us.
The black colored carabiner did not stand out against the dark colored harness and could have easily been overlooked.
- And I guess the regular flavor carabiners would be lost to view hooked to gray and silver colored harnesses. A real can of worms hitherto unconsidered. Great work Joe.

Here's a thought... Mandate matching colors for harnesses and their carabiners. That would get people out of the habit doing cursory inspections to verify fellow pilots' connection statuses.

- Great job lowering the bar to the extent that everybody at this event 'cept Bill performed to the max that could be reasonably expected of any fellow pilot. Me... I'd tend to say that the assholes with multiples of Bill's experience and/or the advantages of being able to see him from behind and the sides were multiples more culpable than this poorly trained novice mountain flyer was. Probably at least half a dozen individuals advising him that he needed to perform a hang check, none of them were capable and/or motivated enough to determine whether or not he was actually hooked in. (Big surprise - the only way they themselves are capable of determining whether or not they themselves are actually hooked in is to get somebody on the nose so they can perform hang checks.)

- Another thought... And I'm totally one hundred percent serious about this one.

- No gliders from the staging area to launch with anybody hooked in. And no hang checks permitted at launch. If you need to do your stupid fucking hang check you do it at your setup space. If you arrive at launch not fully prepped you get sent to the back of the line and docked ten points for the round.

- In the staging area a meet staffer executes preflight sidewire stomp tests on all gliders - demonstrating for the less experienced pilots how to do them without grinding the wires into any of the numerous sharp rocks in the area. If any glider fails the test the team scores zero for the day.

- At launch the pilot hooks himself in, visually verifies the connection, gets confirmation from the launch director.

- Glider is lifted to tight suspension to verify connection and leg loops by:
-- pilot
-- wind
-- assistants
whatever it takes and is green for ten seconds. Again if conditions didn't permit on that effort.

We'd have a culture in which the assumption would be almost constantly that the pilot is NOT hooked in - versus the sewer we've always had before. Maybe shoot two or three Aussie Methodist douchebags to let them know we're serious. And note that we'd still have Craig Pirazzi around.

Being hooked into a glider anywhere 'cept in launch position and in the air is more dangerous - to both the human and the glider - than not being hooked in. But Aussie Methodists don't recognize the existences of dust devils, gust fronts, rotors.
The accident pilot had experienced a failure-to-hook-in event two weeks prior to this accident while attempting flight from a local ramp-launch site.
Which wasn't reported until 2005/10/03 15:13:27 UTC. Prior to that point probably only Bill, the two individuals wiring him up to the back of the old McConnellsburg ramp - Hank Hengst and Cragin Shelton, and Chris McKee who'd been on the ramp prepping to launch - were aware of the incident.

And I've only just realized that this incident occurred in the course of the annual McConnellsburg fly-in - big deal, lotsa stuff going on, great NW thermal conditions both days, hang and para, packed. You can check the Capitol Club rag traffic for that period - numerous references to Bill, not a whisper about this very serious incident. My guess is that it occurred on Day One, Saturday, 2005/09/17 - all the identified players 'cept for Cragin are documented.
He was challenged at launch by another pilot who, grabbing his nose wires, saw that the accident pilot wasn't hooked in and said: "Do you want a hang check?"
- Bullshit. This occurred behind the ramp as he was being wire assisted up the rather steep approach. That statement gives the impression that he was in launch position, ready to commit, when Hank spotted the empty strap and shut things down in the nick of time. (One wonders that if the scenario HAD played out that way whether Bill might have had enough of a fear inoculation for Whitwell to have gone off without incident.)

- Such a pity. Never once in the course of world hang gliding history has anyone who's had a hang check subsequently become separated from his glider during the ensuing flight or effort.
The accident pilot refused this and three additional increasingly emphatic offers to perform a hang check before he was told to examine his carabiner, to discover that he was not yet hooked into his glider.
- HOLY SHIT!!! It seems that it's possible for a pilot to determine whether or not he's hooked just by LOOKING AT his suspension - WITHOUT doing a hang check! Who'da thunk? We need to seriously consider the implications and maybe look into new strategies for dealing with this FTHI problem that's been plaguing us since the dawn of the sport.

- And here's what Rob had to say on the issue in previous month's magazine:
Rob Kells - 2005/12

Each of us agrees that it is not a particular method, but rather the fear of launching unhooked that makes us diligent to be sure we are hooked in every time before starting the launch run.
Anybody have a problem with that? Good. So here's what two of Yours Truly would've done in that situation...

We'd have assisted him up onto the ramp to launch position, followed all his instructions helped get him trimmed for launch with Yours Truly A on his nose and Yours Truly B on his slightly upwind wing, waited for him to clear his nose man.

Then Yours Truly A would've suggested, insisted if necessary, that he lift or let his wing float up to the point that the suspension went taut - just to get some reassurance that his bar clearance looked reasonable.

Then I'd have waited a couple minutes for the color to return, asked him if he'd ever heard of u$hPa's then near quarter century old hook-in check requirement, assured him that his just having come within two footsteps of certain death was not his fault - that it was, instead, the fault of his incompetent douchebag of an Instructor (of the Year) and the whole rotten u$hPa infrastructure above him.

And then I'd have encouraged him to take the flight when he felt ready - WITH THE FUCKIN' HOOK-IN CHECK this time.

And then there would've been a no-punches-pulled discussion of this incident on the Capitol Club wire. But without making Bill feel like an incompetent moron, letting him know that tons of Hang Four rockstars - Participant Pagen included - had made the same or a similar mistake. He was UNDOUBTEDLY deeply embarrassed about the McConnellsburg fuckup and that was probably a factor on this one. Things don't always work the way it seems they should.
Probable Cause: Failure to hook into the glider prior to launch. Failure to complete a full and complete hang check just prior to launching.
Definite Cause: Never once in the history of US hang gliding has a u$hPa certified instructor or ratings official taught, complied with, enforced, supported the hook-in check requirement that went on the books 1981/05 - at this point just a bit shy of four decades ago.

Tell us what a full and complete hang check is - motherfucker.
- carabiner connected and locked
- leg loops
- no twists
- main and backup
- a fist's worth of clearance
- helmet buckled
- parachute pins fully engaged

The CAUSE was that he ran off the fuckin' cliff without being connected to his fuckin' glider. PERIOD. WHY he wasn't connected to his fuckin' glider is an entirely separate issue. And it was supposed to have been dealt with by an SOP that had gone onto the books twenty-four years and five months earlier but not ONE SINGLE u$hPa douchebag instructor or other ratings official has EVER complied with it. THIS:

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC

We visited Steve Wendt yesterday, who was visibly choked up over Bill's death. For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
is his instructor and the asshole most responsible for Bill having run off the fuckin' cliff without being connected to his fuckin' glider. Also for demolishing Holly Korzilius launching from his Happy Acres putting green in similar zilch conditions 125 days, 1 hour, 45 minutes earlier while everybody was still hung over from celebrating his receipt of the 2004 u$hPa Instructor of the Year Award.
Discussion: Launching is one of the most dangerous phases of flight for a hang glider pilot.
Launching is one of the two most dangerous phases of flight for ANY AIRCRAFT - for reasons that are too fuckin' obvious to be worthy of discussion. But this is an issue pretty much unique to hang gliders and shouldn't be discussed or thought about in conventional terms.

Let's go with crossing a highway after coming to a stop at a sign or light. Ya look both ways IMMEDIATELY prior to initiating forward motion. Three minutes ago doesn't quite cut it.

Or hell, we can bring it back to aviation. 1977/03/27 - Tenerife. Two 747s, 583 fatalities, deadliest incident in aviation history. Shit visibility. You get clearance from the tower IMMEDIATELY prior to flooring it and you don't fuck around after you've been given the green.
This is doubly true if the glider is mis-assembled prior to flight.
Yeah Joe. If our glider is mis-assembled prior to flight we're TWICE as likely to experience really unpleasant consequences in our effort to get airborne. Bill got killed on one out of one launches in the course of this event. If everything had been put together properly his survival odds would've been even money for the first one.
Performing a final hang check just prior to flight is the only way to ensure that the glider is completely assembled and airworthy.
- Which is physically impossible to do just prior to flight.

- Yeah, can't be beat for ensuring that your sidewires are good to go.

- Bullshit.

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- How much extra do they pay you for writing totally moronic crap like that?
The final hang check must therefore be performed meticulously and religiously.
Fuck anybody who does ANYTHING in this game RELIGIOUSLY. Religion is how we got stuck with:
- Pagen
- Bobby Fucking-Genius Bailey
- Jim Keen-Intellect Rooney
- Focused Pilots
- perfectly timed landing flare
- floating crossbar
- Infallible Weak Link
- Reliable Release
- biannual sidewires replacement schedule
- Aussie Method
- Joe Greblo's Four or Five Cs

Also fuck meticulousness. Save it for design, engineering, construction, writing.
meticulous: - showing great attention to detail; very careful and precise: he had always been so meticulous about his appearance.
Meticulous is a virtual SYNONYM of...
assiduous: showing great care and perseverance: she was assiduous in pointing out every feature.
The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously.
Bill's meticulousness/assiduousness was a major factor in getting him killed. COMPETENT pilots are constantly assessing ACTUAL THREATS and either neutralizing them or preparing themselves to neutralize them. Our biggest threat on a foot launch is not being hooked in. You neutralize it by assuming you aren't and lifting the glider to make sure you are - once every three seconds or under while you're waiting for the air to straighten up. That's not a meticulousness thing - douchebag. That's a well founded fear response.

While Bill was ASSIDUOUSLY checking his parachute handle in the staging area behind launch he didn't think to pull it when he separated from his glider two seconds after clearing launch. And with at separation the better part of three hundred feet of air between him and the impact point he might have had a chance. If he'd thought of the option immediately the chute would've at least made it out of the container.
Pilots who, for whatever reason, delay assembly or partially disassemble their glider (unhooking and remaining in the harness) while waiting at launch are at increased risk for launching a non-airworthy aircraft.
Go fuck yourself, Joe. This is all stuff you're pulling outta your ass. The people who launch unhooked are the ones who are 100.00 percent positive they're hooked in. The ones who don't are the ones who are constantly scared shitless they're not right up to the point at which it's too late to do anything about it.
Having and maintaining a strict routine is of extreme importance to any pilot.
Got it. From this point on I'm gonna start maintaining strict routines 'cause I now understand how extremely important that is to all pilots.

Fuck the pilots with strict routines. The Columbia was preflighted, launched, flown, docked, landed, serviced using nothing but extremely strict routines. Also incinerated along with seven astronauts due to a known-by-everyone-and-his-dog issue 'cause the strict routines were fatally flawed. And it's a good bet that scores of strict routines could've been violated without results as catastrophic as they were on 2003/02/01.

Wow. A decade and a day prior to Zack Marzec - who was launching from pretty much within sight of the Columbia's launch and intended landing location. And Zack was also launching under strict routines that those total douchebags almost always managed to get away with. Extremely long track record with very strictly enforced procedures.
The accident pilot may have been nervous due to his inexperience with mountain launches and his relative lack of competition experience.
Yeah...
- He was new to mountain flying and under all those competition pressures that so stress out the wind dummies.
- His RELATIVE lack of competition experience. ZERO. Would've still been zero at the end of the week if all had gone well 'cause he wasn't competing.

Two weekends prior he almost certainly would've launched unhooked at McConnellsburg on a totally normal recreational flying day if he hadn't been caught by a wire assistant. So why spew this totally useless total speculation on his presumed state of mind due to presumed stresses of the circumstances at the time? Tell us about all the stresses...

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...B Asher was supposed to have been under during this exercise.

And as far as I'm concerned Bill was way less culpable than all the motherfuckers in the vicinity who could've checked and stopped him - just like at McConnellsburg with far fewer pairs of eyes around.

Pagen was there. He'd sent his glider off the hill without him at Morningside 1993/09/28 09:10 EST - a tiny bit over a dozen years prior - in total nothing circumstances. That was also a dozen years plus change subsequent to when u$hPa's hook-in check SOP was supposed to have been implemented. And Morningside was the point at which he started getting with the program.

So what was he doing at the time that was more important than observing the first wind dummy launch of the week's fun comp? He knew the danger and he knew that only a handful of glider people on the planet were implementing the procedure - and that ZERO commercial instructors were teaching it.
The latter is an important point...
Sure. You've said so. So obviously.
...because competition has a tendency to increase the tension and the distraction level (even though this was a low key "fun" meet.)
- But make sure to keep playing up the fake competition issue anyway 'cause it helps to fill up pages and distract from actual issues.

- What were the tension and the distraction levels at McConnellsburg two weekends prior when he was stopped by his crew from making the identical mistake? (Which wouldn't have been the first time that identical mistake had been committed at McConnellsburg on a run-of-the-mill rec flying weekend.)
Additionally this was a new site to this pilot, and he was flying with some new and less-than-familiar electronic equipment.
Pity he didn't have the experience of a Dennis Pagen, Bob Gillisse, Kunio Yoshimura, Jim Rooney, Jon Orders...
All of these factors can serve to break a pilot's routine.
He didn't have and wasn't taught any routine that complied with u$hPa SOPs.
Pilots flying under conditions that break their normal routine must exercise vigilance to ensure that all required checks are successfully completed prior to flight.
- All required checks... all battens secured, helmet buckled, hooked in, shoes tied, carabiner locked, radio frequency, sidewires replaced within the past six months... Any one of this issues could prove critical in some not easily predictable scenario.

- Truly inspirational advice, Joe. I'm sure that now pilots flying under conditions that break their normal routine will exercise vigilance to ensure that all required checks are successfully completed prior to flight.
The accident pilot had trained and flown primarily via aerotow. He was relatively new to mountain flying and his background may have been a factor in this accident.
And here I was thinking that we had a Pilot Proficiency Program in which pilots are supposed to be properly and thoroughly trained and qualified before being cleared to operate and fly in more demanding and potentially hazardous environments. Maybe we should start taking a look at the guy whose signature is on Bill's card.

No, wait. That was Steve Wendt who just months prior was recognized with u$hPa's Instructor of the Year Award. They were all at Manquin celebrating when Tex Forrest made a good decision in the favor of Holly Korzilius and left her half dead on the runway. And he's exceptionally knowledgeable. Hell, he's the one who signed Jim Rooney off on his instructor rating. (Speaking of unhooked launches.)

And you've told us that the accident pilot had reportedly just DISCOVERED mountain flying. He'd just heard about it from other pilots who occasionally fly Steve's Manquin scooter, platform, aero operation and thought it might be fun to give it a go - without receiving any relevant instruction whatsoever. And Steve was totally unaware of the fact that he'd started doing this. Same way he was totally unaware of the fact that Holly was gonna do a pro toad AT launch without taking the short clinic which he runs and mandates before anyone is permitted to hook up pro toad. It's a total miracle that he survived as long as he did in those mountain environments.
The routine developed for performing a pre-flight safety check is different when launching from a dolly via aerotow vs. launching from a mountain site - increasing the potential for the pilot to make a serious oversight impacting safety of flight.
Yeah, on an AT dolly launch there's no possibility of rolling off unhooked. Ya just gotta make sure you're using an appropriate weak link with a finished length of 1.5 inches or less and any releases are within easy reach.

Also AT launches are twenty times as dangerous as mountain launches due to all the additional complexity involved so his guard would've been way down.
Pilots experienced and confident in one launch method or maneuver should be cognizant of the fact that their skills and abilities may not be at the same level when performing a new launch method or maneuver.
Yeah Joe, that was the problem. Bill really didn't have the skills and abilities to ensure that he was hooked in prior to running off the cliff. And all the assholes packed together at the Whitwell launch didn't have the skills and abilities to notice that he wasn't hooked in prior to running off the cliff for his wind dummy exercise.
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Recommendation: Always perform a full and complete hang check...
Define "a full and complete hang check". Show me the u$hPa SOP in which it's defined so's we can all get on the same page. Does it include making sure your helmet chinstrap is buckled? Or is that just a Grebloville thing?
...just prior to launching.
- Thanks Joe. He got that recommendation repeatedly within ten minutes of running off the cliff unhooked. But if assholes like you keep making it even more repeatedly it should start working even better.

- It is physically impossible to perform a full and complete hang check just prior to launching 'cause after you complete it you need to stand up, lift and trim the glider, clear you nose man, wait for a cycle. This is why people do hook-in checks to verify their connections - and their leg loops which the full and complete hang check DOESN'T - just prior to launch.

- How 'bout this, Joe?

Recommendation: Hook into your glider before running off a cliff with it.
Pilots should make full use of their wire crew, when available, to assist in evaluating their aircraft (glider and harness) for airworthiness prior to launching.
- You sound a lot like Rooney would if you multiplied his IQ by a factor of five or six. I wonder how you feel about yourself spewing crap like that.

- But do make an effort to assemble your wire crew with something better than the useless dregs Bill had at his disposal.

- Tell me why someone who needs assistance in evaluating his aircraft (glider and harness) for airworthiness prior to launching has any fucking business launching. Bill Priday was signed off to be able to do all this shit by u$hPa's 2004 Instructor of the Year Steve Exceptionally-Knowledgeable Wendt. Why do you think he wasn't able to? Doesn't the fact that he wasn't - twice within the span of three weekends - tell us that the entire system is totally shitrigged?

- If we get a do-over on this one with only the option of eliminating the crew we eliminate the crew. The results couldn't get any worse and minus a crew there's a fair chance that he feels less secure. And that's exactly what we need him to be feeling.

- We have at least one major glider manufacturer factory fixing its suspension spreaders like:

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and hotshot jock douchebags like Chris Valley taking things a step further like:

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Maybe you could provide us with a list of a dozen trustworthy individuals scattered around the country we can use as reliable consultants.

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6. What you're saying is that Bill's u$hPa instructor - one of the best of the best in the history of the sport - is incapable of reliably training his products how to run off cliffs while secured to their gliders. Maybe we'll get lucky with whatever we have available for a crew. Russian roulette. Yeah, I totally agree. That system needs to be shut down. Eliminate certified instruction and the Pilot Proficiency System. Let individuals purchase equipment, adhere to FAA regs, decide for themselves what they're qualified to do. Kite Strings provides any instruction information you wanna name for free. Or they can go to Red Howard and help us get the gene pool cleaned up a little faster.
Techniques, such as the so-called "Aussie technique" of completely assembling the glider before pre-flight and not removing the harness until flight is complete, can be used to eliminate one common failure mode - that of unhooking from the glider and failing to properly hook back in prior to launching.
Yeah, they CAN...

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=13359
Today was a bad day!
Mike Bomstad - 2009/08/26 04:21:15 UTC

The harness is part of the aircraft... end of story.
(Just because it's easy to remove, does not mean it should be. Dont choose the path of least resistance)

Attach it to the wing, completing the aircraft.... then preflight the completed aircraft.
Buckle yourself into the cockpit and then your ready.
But they...

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...DON'T.
Another technique that can be used to eliminate critical errors is the religious use of checklists...
Bullshit.

Religion has ZERO place in aviation. Save it for praying for full and speedy recoveries after it's too late to do anything of legitimate value. Checklists are read and adhered to by humans. Humans miss items on checklists probably even more easily and frequently than they do on the real deal. I personally sat on the back of the pickup Bill's ace instructor - Steve Exceptionally-Knowledgeable Wendt - was using for a platform launch.

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Steve started going down the half dozen item checklist, skipped right over "DISENGAGE NOSE SAFETY", gave his driver the green. As we were accelerating I reached up and disengaged the nose safety. And it just now occurs to me that if Steve HADN'T been using the checklist he probably WOULDN'T have missed the nose safety.

(By the way, Joe... Any thoughts on how Steve managed to tow this guy into an abrupt lockout in nothing conditions on a payout rig?)

I used a checklist at setup at Ridgely to help me to help me efficiently stage sequences, keep gear organized and properly stowed. Ditto for breakdown. All chickenshit stuff. And it got folded back up and went back into my wallet before I hiked my glider and harness across the taxiway and to the back of the launch line. And it stayed there until breakdown.

Never once in history of the sport has anyone said, "Came within an inch of launching unhooked Saturday. THANK GOD I had my checklist with me!" And nobody on a launch crew has ever caught an FTHI situation thanks to his checklist. Ditto for any of these stupid...

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...Rebar Dan DeWeese bricks.
...and standardized procedures.
Not to be confused with u$hPa's Standard Operating Procedures which state:
With each flight, demonstrates a method of establishing that the pilot is hooked in just prior to launch.
Just some more bullshit you're gonna throw out for us to help take up space in u$hPa's bullshit magazine.
Over the century-long course of manned-aviation history, maintaining a strict routine and standardized procedure has proven a potent safety multiplier. Hang glider pilots experience a much wider range of conditions during take-off, approach, and landing than do most pilots of conventional aircraft. Additionally, the individualist nature of our sport does not lend well to efforts at standardization.
And yet from the early Nineties until early last decade we all flew AT with the 1.0 G 130 pound Greenspot Standard Aerotow Weak Link - regardless of glider model, hook-in weight, flying weight, bridle configuration, experience level, currency, conditions, FAA AT regulations, resulting levels of carnage. Then shortly after the afternoon of 2013/02/02 Davis and his Flight Park Mafia buddies decided we'd be happier being able to choose between 140 and 200.

The individualist nature of our sport...

Really gotta admire the individualist nature of our sport. And fuck those efforts at standardization. If standardization was what we wanted we'd all be flying sailplanes. (Instead of sitting around waiting for relights watching our sport and flight parks going extinct.)

And where the hell were you for any of that shit?

The individualist nature of our sport...
...one pilot who had been talking with him said, "Be sure to do a hang check."
At this point his team leader told the accident pilot, "Do a hang check."
Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were four or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?"
Several pilots present at the scene reported they checked his hang point and it looked like he was hooked in.
http://ozreport.com/12.081
Weaklinks - the HGFA rules
Davis Straub - 2008/04/22 14:47:00 UTC

Getting pilots into the air quickly is also safer as it reduces the stress that pilots feel on the ground and keeps them focused on their job which is to launch safely and without hassling the ground crew or themselves. When we look at safety we have to look at the whole system, not just one component of that system. One pilot may feel that one component is unsafe from his point of view and desire a different approach, but accommodating one pilot can reduce the overall safety of the system.
Yeah, right.
This puts hang glider pilots at significantly increased risk compared to their fixed-wing brethren...
Got news for ya, Joe...
fixed-wing - denoting aircraft of the conventional type as opposed to those with rotating wings, such as helicopters.
Hang gliders are FIXED-WING aircraft. Ditto for sailplanes - even though they ALSO unfix their wings to get to, from, back to the airport.
...and this risk must be managed intelligently and professionally.
Oh, we're gonna start managing risk intelligently and professionally. I can hardly wait. (And if you were all that fucking intelligent and professional you'd know what fixed-wing aircraft are.)

By the way... Hang gliding isn't supposed to be a flavor of professional aviation. It's supposed to be strictly recreational. But over the decades all the sleazebags who've infiltrated it have found avenues for fine-printing their way around that designation...

http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=24846
Is this a joke ?
Jim Rooney - 2011/08/25 04:55:25 UTC

It always amazes to hear know it all pilots arguing with the professional pilots.
I mean seriously, this is our job.
We do more tows in a day than they do in a month (year for most).

We *might* have an idea of how this stuff works.
They *might* do well to listen.
Not that they will, mind you... cuz they *know*.

I mean seriously... ridgerodent's going to inform me as to what Kroop has to say on this? Seriously? Steve's a good friend of mine. I've worked at Quest with him. We've had this discussion ... IN PERSON. And many other ones that get misunderstood by the general public. It's laughable.
...and have thus destroyed it.
Since our aircraft are so simple, use of a written checklist has proven unnecessary for most pilots.
Name some for whom it's proven necessary. Let's put Rafi Lavin on a Wills Wing glider. Did he skip the sidewire stomp test because it slipped his mind? If only he'd been using a written checklist?

I'll tell ya one thing about the guys with checklists - like Greg Porter - and gadgets - like Harry Martin. They're not gonna launch unhooked. And that's not 'cause their checklists and/or gadgets are gonna catch the relevant issues. Notice the way nobody's ever credited one with a save. They have the checklists and/or gadgets 'cause they know they're capable of and are afraid of doing it.
Rob Kells - 2005/12

Each of us agrees that it is not a particular method, but rather the fear of launching unhooked that makes us diligent to be sure we are hooked in every time before starting the launch run.
The Aussie Methodist assholes don't stop themselves or their flying buddies from launching unhooked because they have a proven system that works.
This, unfortunately, makes us vulnerable to making critical omissions when conditions cause a break in our individual routine. Alarm bells should go off in our heads when we note a break in our routine.
Fuck our routines - 'specially our routines in environments in which FTHI is an actual issue. Our "routines" are broken and different every time we fly. Our setup locations are different, we often fly different gliders and harnesses, we're layering up with different clothing for different conditions, we're getting called on to help maneuver gliders onto launch and crew. Launch windows close and reopen as winds ramp up, lull, shift direction.

We finish getting our battens stuffed, wing tensioned, stomp tested, instruments and cameras set... It ain't all that complicated, significant mistakes are hard to miss, and if you're too fuckin' stupid to verify your connection within a couple seconds of launch then you're in the wrong sport. (Bill wasn't too fuckin' stupid. He was just another victim of shit instruction and a total douchebag culture.)

And your alarm bells would be going off all the fuckin' time. And alarm bells that go off all the fuckin' time IMMEDIATELY cease being alarm bells and IMMEDIATELY start becoming background noise, annoyances, distractions.

Bill WAS in a new environment (and at this (his final) stage with only about a dozen mountain flight scattered over various sites)...
The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously. At least one witness stated that the accident pilot appeared a bit nervous both in this situation and before, while setting up his glider.
...and HAD alarm bells going off all over the place as he prepped for and executed launch. Problem was he didn't have the one that really mattered at the moment it really mattered - just like every other motherfucker involved in and watching that launch.

The alarm bell that we actually need and the one that actually works is the one that COMPETENT foot launch pilots have as they're about to commit. "Just how sure am I that I'm hooked in and have my leg loops? How flawlessly is my memory working right now?"
One way to manage this risk is to limit changes to equipment, flying sites, venue, and flying tasks to one element at a time. If you decide to fly a new site, for instance, avoid doing so with a brand-new harness or wing.
Boy, what a godsend it's been having you to explain all this shit to us. (Your mission, should you decide to accept, is to stuff a few magazine pages with a torrent of professional sounding useless crap to create the illusion that we're a legitimate, competent, responsible sport aviation organization.)

Go ahead, motherfucker... Cite some statistics to show us how and why all these changes - alterations in equipment, sites, venues, flying tasks - have any statistical bearing on unhooked launches whatsoever.

http://www.kitestrings.org/post12100.html#p12100
Mike Ivey - 2020/10/10

An argument could be made that a flyer dealing with loads of non routine shit would be MORE tuned in than he would doing the run-of-the-mill grind.
One important technique for managing risk at launch is to always make efficient use of any available ground crew.
- Yeah, you can never have too many cooks. The more the merrier.

- The Whitwell launch area was a sardine can as Bill prepped to launch. What's your point?

- Anybody beyond 2.3 level who needs crew to handle issues beyond helping to keep the glider under control on the ramp or cart shouldn't be rated beyond 2.3 level.
The pilot in command bears sole responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight.
- And the rating official who trained, qualified, certified him or her is totally off the hook.

- This was/is a Three rated site. Bill wouldn't have been cleared to fly if he weren't a known Three and/or his card hadn't been checked.

- Bill was functioning as a wind dummy.
A call for wind dummies was made, and the meet director was assessing conditions while awaiting volunteer non-competition pilots to arrive and perform the first launches.
(You made the mistake of putting that in print.)

- The Meet Head wouldn't have given that launch the green and Bill wouldn't have initiated it unless:
-- a fair smattering of regular comp gliders were ready to go
-- he had assessed the conditions as suitable

- If Bill had been approaching launch with a loose port tip batten he'd have been stopped and the issue would've been rectified.
Thus, performing a full and complete hang check just prior to flight is the sole responsibility of the pilot in command.
- Then how come none of the rating requirements that u$hPa's had on the books even mention a hang check - let alone define exactly what a full and complete hang check is and a time limit regarding "just prior to flight" to keep little shits like Ryan from claiming fifteen minutes is well within bounds?

And what's on the books is "just prior to LAUNCH" - not "just prior to FLIGHT". And the latter dilutes the impact of the intent.

- Duh. Bill could've legally and in accordance with everything on the books been up there launching totally solo. Hitchhike back up to launch to retrieve the vehicle. I did that on a few occasions at Woodstock. So what's your point?

-Got it, Joe. The primary purpose of filling up all this magazine acreage is to make sure nobody looks at or even thinks about this guy's shit noncompliant instruction and the total incompetence of the event organizers. And if you breathe a word about the "just prior to launch" issue the whole thing blows up in the faces of all the guilty parties.

- Bullshit. While there may not be a case for criminal negligence there's a real good case for civil liability. If this meet had gone off without a hitch and everybody had scored super flying experiences all week then everybody would've been congratulating Dean Funk and the relevant Tree Toppers on what great jobs they'd done. And you can't check the guy's card and conditions and move him up to the edge of the cliff unattached to his glider and then start playing the personal responsibility card. And if I'd been handling the suit for Bill's family it would've taken me about three milliseconds to demolish Steve for having violated the shit outta u$hPa's 1981/05 hook-in check mandate.
In discharging this responsibility, pilots should make maximum use of available ground crew to help ensure that whatever checks they routinely perform have been successfully completed prior to flight.
"I'm pretty sure I have my carabiner properly hooked into my hang strap - but I'm not entirely sure I got it well enough to keep me connected to my glider all the way down to the LZ. When you guys get through wiring that glider off would you mind coming back here and give things a thorough review? This sport runs on opinions and the more I get the more confident I am."

Nice job dialing this one down to the level of "all battens secured" and omitting the specification that this one needs to be effected IMMEDIATELY prior to launch because:
- there are legitimate reasons for:
-- arriving at launch unhooked
-- unhooking after moving the glider to or near to launch position
- an unsecured batten can be more obvious than an empty hang strap
Recommendation: Event organizers should encourage all pilots involved in an event to demonstrate that their aircraft is airworthy just prior to flight as a condition for launching during the event.
- Great idea. Designate a staging area about ten yards behind launch. Have the pilot hook in, main and backup, locked, proper clearance, helmet buckled... Next.

- Bill's aircraft was in great shape just prior to and during flight. Launched fine then - with no pilot input whatsoever - pulled up and landed pretty safely.

- Demonstrate to whom? And if whom misses something of significant importance what does he get in the way of consequences?

- Your PERSONAL recommendation? Who the fuck qualified you to go above and beyond the SOPs to tell us what we should be doing?
While the pilot in command bears sole responsibility for performing all required checks, accurately judging conditions, and conducting a safe flight...
How 'bout Bill? He was never connected to his glider on the last day of his life so it's a bit of a stretch to consider him any kind of pilot in command.
...it behooves everyone to do what they can to help fellow pilots achieve these goals.
They did. Lotsa participants asked him if he'd had a hang check, told him to make sure he got a hang check, verified that it looked like he was hooked in... What more do you want?
The wide range of operating conditions and flying equipment, the self-imposed lack of standardized operating practices...
The SELF-IMPOSED lack of standardized operating practices? Every time a legitimate SOP - like "just prior to launch", RLF, AT release capacity, minimum weak link rating, weak link configuration - has reared its ugly head the commercial interests have decided en masse to ignore and undermine it.
...and the understandable pre-occupation we all have ensuring the safe conduct of our own flight...
So how did that work out? Nobody ever once checked Bill out well enough to verify that he was connected to his glider, he was needlessly killed, emergency responders were called out, no other gliders flew that day, tons of people were horribly traumatized, a fair chunk of the participants bagged it and went home, next of kin filed a lawsuit against the club and national organization...

The collective competence of all those in Bill's vicinity and crewing at launch wasn't adequate to neutralize what everyone and his dog knew was the greatest threat to this flight. Why should we think people would do better with their own gear?

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1153
Hooking In
Steve Kinsley - 2005/10/02 02:45:48 UTC

I already see where the anger and grief take us. We need to do hang checks, double hang checks. And who was on Bill's wire crew? How could they let that happen?

When Bob Gillisse got hurt I suggested that our local institution of the hang check is more the problem than the solution. I still believe that. It subverts the pilot's responsibility to perform a hook-in check. I often do not see pilots doing a hook in check. Why should they? They just did a hang check and they are surrounded by friends who will make sure this box is checked.

But what if there is no hang check and you are used to one?

DO A HOOK IN CHECK. You need a system that you do every time regardless of how many hang checks you have been subjected to that assures you are hooked in.
...makes this an extremely difficult task for the community.
- Not me. I'm quite capable of getting myself safely together and prepped. And when I'm not busy with my own setup I'm constantly looking around at other gliders. If I'd gotten my own shit together and moved up to observe that launch Bill wouldn't have gone off unhooked. And I'd have used the opportunity to explain to those dickheads what a hook-in check was and why it's in the SOPs everyone chooses to violate.

- Fuck the community. There is no community. Sport's controlled by commercial interests interested only in keeping their asses covered and you're working for them to curry favor.
Organized events, however, provide a more controlled and constrained environment, one where procedures could be implemented that would significantly enhance safety.
Yeah, take John Claytor at the 2014 Ridgely ECC for example. Right after he broke his neck coming off the cart on a makeshift runway in a severe left cross the Safety Committee shut things down for the day.
While several people reportedly challenged the pilot to confirm that he had performed a hang check, and had glanced at his equipment to see if everything looked OK, no one demanded to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch.
Yeah Joe. Keep emphasizing the full and complete hang check. You don't want people thinking that all it would've taken was one individual to go to the trouble of looking at or for his carabiner. It was all Bill's fault for not completing a full and complete hang check as a condition people helping him launch.
Had such a demand been made, and the accident pilot complied, this accident would never have occurred.
It would've occurred two weekends later - based upon our experience with Bill and Steve Wendt's training of him - in another mountain launch environment. And Steve Wendt didn't say anything about hang checks. The motherfucker never even had a public comment on this one. All we have is:

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC

For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
But I guess Bill never really understood the importance of doing that.
C.J. Sturtevant

A previous Master's Tips column by Rob Kells (page 56 in last month's issue) also addresses dealing with distractions during pre-flight, and offers suggestions on how to ensure that pilot and glider are firmly connected before committing aviation. It's worth rereading.
Why? I thought Joe covered every imaginable base at least three times over in this report. Or do you disagree?

From Impact plus Three:

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1167
The way it outa be
Steve Kinsley - 2005/10/04 14:04:25 UTC

One last attempt.

We have now rounded up all the usual suspects and promised renewed vigilance, nine page checklists, hang checks every six feet, et cetera. Bob Gillisse redux.

A hang check is part of preflighting your equipment. You do it in the setup area - not on the launch or the ramp. When you get in line you are hooked in and ready to go. No going down for a hang check cum hook in check.
And Joe lives (lived?) 0.45 crow flight miles almost straight north of Steve in DC. And they did a lot of weekend flying trips together. And Steve was like an uncle/godfather to Joe and Janet's little adopted Eastern European kid. And that article is a total insult to what Rob, Steve, Doug Hildreth, the u$hPa SOPs, and (most articulately) Yours Truly have been saying. Anybody think it's a simple oversight that nowhere in that mountain of drivel does Joe even MENTION anything about any form of hook-in check?

Guess it took Tom Galvin the better part of another seven years to come up with the "false sense of security" angle.

Nice job, Joe. I have no doubt whatsoever that instructors will overhaul their programs appropriately, people will frequently cite passages from this article over the coming decades, the unhooked launch problem will rapidly fade into little more than a relic of the past.
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

Doug Hildreth - 1990/03

The instructional programs to assure hook-in within fifteen seconds of launch have apparently not caught up with the masses.
Yeah Doug? A bit shy of nine years after the SOP went on the books... Have you documented the existence of ONE SINGLE instructional program that conformed to it? You haven't, none is, you're wasting your time doing these unhooked launch fatality reports while turning a blind eye to what's going on at all the training hills.
Doug Hildreth - 1980/11

In February, 1980, at the Board of Directors Meeting in Denver, and Accident Review Subcommittee of the Safety and Training Committee was created. Its purpose was to collect, analyze and report data on hang gliding accidents, such that through education a decrease in incidents and severity of hang gliding accidents might occur. The primary role of the committee was to collect and analyze data on non-fatal accidents since R.V. Wills has been doing an excellent job related to fatalities.

Over the last six months a number of reports have come in, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank each and every one of you who has contributed to our information store. I would also like to implore those of you who are aware of a hang gliding accident, to report it to me through the USHGA. All too frequently everyone will assume someone else will send in a report, and one is never received.

Despite the relatively limited number of reports we have to date, and the fact that they have not been totally analyzed, some findings and trends have become so blatantly obvious to me that I thought a non-statistical editorial impression was mandatory at this point to make fliers aware of what's happening.

Failure to hook in: Despite this terribly obvious item, it continues to be a significant cause of accident and death. The Safety and Training Committee is recommending that all instructors require a maneuver (lifting up the glider to feel tight straps) such that the pilot always knows that he is hooked in. Routine hang checks before launch are mandatory in our club, and we recently had a visiting pilot refuse to allow us to hold his nose and do a hang check. The following day he launched without being hooked in (fortunately, the slope is gradual). Two other items: the Montana group has practiced climbing back into the control bar (control bar hanging in a hangar to develop their skills with this predicament). Although a few pilots have "flown it down" in the control bar without being hooked in, it is more common for them to fly away from the hill, get significant altitude, and then "lose it." It appears that almost always it is more advisable to let go of the glider immediately on launch and fall a relatively short distance.
We have reports from no later than the late Seventies of individual pilots employing lift and tug hook-in checks. Tell me why no instructors were incorporating this technique within a half hour of the earliest known instance.

You report 1980/11 that the Safety and Training Committee is recommending that all instructors require a maneuver (lifting up the glider to feel tight straps) such that the pilot always knows that he is hooked in but we don't get the announcement of the implementation of the SOP for another six months. This:

1977/03/05 - Robert Sage - Sierra Vista, Arizona
1977/04/17 - Richard Thomson - East Brady, Pennsylvania
1977/04/21 - Hans Heumannn - Walberla, Germany
1977/05/14 - Klaus Crummenauer - Trier-Riol, Germany
1977/05/28 - Zuglian Walter - Bassano del Grappa, Italy
1977/06/27 - Ray Galan - Milfred Peak, British Columbia

is what can happen in the way of unhooked launch fatalities in the space of well under four months. You're selling a lethally flawed recreational product and you have the fix but the official recall notice doesn't go out for SIX MONTHS? And then after nearly a decade of no more than one percent of flyers doing actual hook-in checks the problem is that the instructional programs to assure hook-in within fifteen seconds of launch have apparently not caught up with the masses? Have you ever bothered to talk to one of the members of one of these masses about what he was and wasn't being instructed to conform to in the way of procedures?

And it was never supposed to be fifteen seconds - it was supposed to have been JUST PRIOR. Funny the way we're able to get our flare timing perfected to within a tenth of a second but when we're standing on launch, often with crew to assist us, a substantial portion of a minute is the best we seem to be able to do. When we're flying in situations in which they're keeping score we often need to execute well inside of a window of one second - staying behind a tug, light or turbulent air dune flying, thermalling efficiently and/or in traffic, reacting to a stall, turning on final into a tight field... Fifteen seconds will probably work. But name a situation in which we can do it in fifteen but not two.

And that report was over three decades ago. And it's hard to remember the era when u$hPa tolerated individuals motivated to identify and fix problems with SOPs and instruction rather than portray u$hPa as the pinnacle of perfection and dump 100.00 percent of the shit on the dead guy. And anyone not 100.00 percent on board with that doesn't need to be involved in our sport. Only problem with that is that our sport no longer has enough individuals involved in it for manufacturers, flight parks, chapters for things to be sustainable. Also that the people still involved in our sport tend to be total crud.

And now we have Joe Gregor's disposal of Bill Priday's 2005/10/01.

To make sure we all understand that nobody - with the possible exception of the dead guy - did anything wrong we have 29 occurrences of the word "accident". And for "incident" we have three - one of which refers to the near miss two weeks prior at McConnellsburg. And the other two are separated from "accident" by six words. (That might've made things too obvious - really conspicuous overkill.)
Failure to complete a full and complete hang check just prior to launching.
Always perform a full and complete hang check just prior to launching.
Thus, performing a full and complete hang check just prior to flight is the sole responsibility of the pilot in command.
While several people reportedly challenged the pilot to confirm that he had performed a hang check, and had glanced at his equipment to see if everything looked OK, no one demanded to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch.
Yeah Joe, A FULL AND COMPLETE HANG CHECK - whatever the fuck that is - is the ONLY WAY of determining whether or not someone is connected to his glider. We can't just LOOK to see whether or not there's an actual connection between the glider and the harnessed pilot - the way Hank Hengst did at McConnellsburg two weeks prior to the fatal. And once we've done A FULL AND COMPLETE HANG CHECK we are GOOD TO GO for the next ninety minutes. After that we're required to do another one to make sure a squirrel hasn't gnawed through anything important.

The definition of a full and complete hang check exists NOWHERE so we'll go with what it IS possible to reasonably define. The pilot installs himself in his harness as best he can and hooks into his glider's suspension. Or in some circumstances he can hook the harness to the glider's suspension and then install himself in his harness. Then a second individual pulls the glider's nose down to something around normal neutral pitch as the pilot prones out and fully loads the suspension. All this does is tell us what the bar clearance will be when airborne at one G loading IF we haven't yet fucked anything up. And we knew that already from last weekend

Minus a lot of carries between car and setup / breakdown and car the hang check is about the most labor intensive task we're likely to have on a flying day.

ALL other checks are more effectively, safely, efficiently made with the glider sitting on its tail and the pilot standing up not bothering and wasting the time of anybody else - full and proper engagement, suspension elements untwisted and properly routed, sound condition of components, leg loops, zippers, buckles, chute container secured, helmet, radio, release configuration.

And unless it's a new or modified suspension configuration there is ZERO need or justification for doing a hang check. At Mingus on 2008/08/30 there was some asshole helping some other asshole execute a full and complete hang check at the south launch while Kunio was moving up to launch position unhooked at the north launch. Good thing we had that bar clearance verified as still good. Things were ugly enough that day without any additional issues.

I have no idea whether or not that's accurate. But I do know that if we totally outlawed hang checks at all launches save for new or altered configurations we'd have a lot more people thinking about connection status as gliders prepped to launch.
Organized events, however, provide a more controlled and constrained environment, one where procedures could be implemented that would significantly enhance safety.
What? Like having a staging area a bit behind launch for flyers to do final preps and get checked out by a meet official? And a Launch Director at the ramp to verify the connection and ensure that the glider's launched as safely as possible? EXCELLENT suggestion. I believe that's what they started doing on Day 2. Made it through the rest of the comp without killing anyone else as I recall.
While several people reportedly challenged the pilot to confirm that he had performed a hang check, and had glanced at his equipment to see if everything looked OK, no one demanded to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch. Had such a demand been made, and the accident pilot complied, this accident would never have occurred.
Oh. We're not gonna do that. We're just gonna hope that some other competitor will demand to observe a full and complete hang check as a condition of helping him launch. If we suggest an actual organized procedure - what everyone and his dog knew should've been done as they watched Bill's glider climb back up without him - that would indicate negligence on the parts of the TTT "organizers" and u$hPa.

This Team Challenge one I'd rank as the most important and - for the Industry - problematic unhooked launch incident of all time.

2012/04/28 - Woodside - Jon Orders / Lenami Godinez-Avila had, hands down, the most global impact, in no small part due to the video card swallowing stunt. 2003/03/29 - Coronet Peak - Steve Parson / Eleni Zeri a somewhat distant second. But they were able to 100.00 percent dump on the tandem thrill ride drivers, throw them to the criminal justice system, let them have felony manslaughter convictions for making the same mistake eighty percent of the top players in the sport have made just about always with laugh-offable level consequences.

Bill Priday...

Legitimate enthusiastic hang glider pilot with solid Three level skills in the earlier stages of coming up through the ranks pretty much as we all have.

Likeable. I met him once - 2004/09/20 at what would be the scene of the Holly Korzilius near negligent homicide 2005/05/29 and a year plus a week and a half before Bill was gonna buy it - and *I* liked him. Can't remember what we talked about beyond the fact that was substantive but I do remember thinking that he had potential. (Also remember coming away with the final realization that his instructor didn't.)

This:

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=722
Hyner 4th in detail (long)
Brian Vant-Hull - 2005/07/05 19:02:29 UTC

Bill is an outstanding classical guitar player, with a repertoire that ranges from Bach to the Blues, and he became the background music for many of the campfires. I made a promise to myself to never leave for bed until Bill called it quits, and found out that several others had made the same promise to themselves. It turns out Manquin has a bonfire nearly every Saturday night, and I will start to make my way down there from time to time, lured by the evocative Spanish guitar of Bill Priday.
makes it worse. (Three months left to live at that point.)

The Tennessee Tree Toppers Team Challenge is supposed to be primarily geared as a...

http://airtribune.com/ttt-team-challenge-2016/
TTT Team Challenge 2016
Tennessee Tree Toppers' Team Challenge is the original free flight learning and teaching competition, teaming Advanced, Intermediate and Master hang glider and paraglider pilots for a full week of airtime, seminars, skills progression (and warm, friendly predation seeking trophies, prizes and bling.
...teaching/learning event. And as far as I'm concerned that should extend to wuffos - let alone wind dummies like Bill.
Several pilots present at the scene reported that there were four or five other individuals who said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?"
I'll betchya there weren't four or five other individuals who would've said, "Do a hang check," or "Have you done a hang check?" to Dennis Pagen. Bill was recognized as a new mountain flyer and that crowd was worried about him launching unhooked. And no, they weren't concerned that he might launch with a less than ideal bar clearance. And a check of that is the only legitimate reason for a hang check and only once after a change of a glider/harness configuration.

The place was packed. There were probably a couple dozen people who observed the launch and probably everybody present would've heard the impact several seconds later.

Responses...

- Rob Kells' 2005/12 magazine article. Rob does and explains the lift and tug hook-in check right and gives it prominence. But hell, here are some equally valid approaches from Oz, Rob McKenzie, Steve Pearson, Pat Denevan. And he:

-- says NOTHING about the fact that his approach was supposed to have been implemented as an SOP over fourteen and a half years prior but zero instructors and ratings officials and damn few individual flyers ever started complying with it

-- doesn't mention (it's just occurred to me) that it's not physically possible for some pilot/glider combos in dead or light air and minus crew assistance

- Joe Gregor's 2006/01 Russian novel's worth of a pretense of a military jargon saturated report that:
-- is totally devoid of any actual substance
-- puts the reader to sleep before making it to the ten percent mark
-- bends over backwards to omit any hint of any reference to any:
--- flavor of a hook in check
--- deficiencies in the:
---- competence of Bill's u$hPa required and certified instruction
---- running of the u$hPa sanctioned and promoted competition event

- Bill Priday's kids' lawsuit against the Tennessee Tree Toppers Flight Director and u$hPa a bit shy of two years after the incident.

- The u$hPa / Paul Voight video showing us how to Pre Flight our equipment so carefully and thoroughly that it would be totally moronic for anybody to execute a hook-in check just prior to launch - dedicated in loving memory to William F. Priday - 1952 to 2005/10/01 14:00 EDT (whom none of those sleazy ass covering motherfuckers knew from Adam's off ox).

- Zero relevant changes in any:
-- u$hPa SOPs
-- instructional programs

Ya read Joe's report as a regular reader it just sounds boring, pretentious, clueless, totally useless. Ya REALLY read Joe's report and ya see how deliberately and carefully engineered it is to:
- bore the reader into a coma and thus keep his brain disengaged - hopefully permanently
- delude the reader into believing something that extensive must surely:
-- include material of actual substance
-- have tagged all possible bases
-- be an indication of how seriously and conscientiously u$hPa and the hang gliding community are taking this one
- bury the fact that u$hPa's 1981/05 enacted hook-in check mandate:
-- has never existed
-- is blatantly disregarded by all u$hPa instructors and 99.9 percent rated flyers

And note the way that - outside of Kite Strings and not before now - there has never been a single known public comment on / response to the official u$hPa certified report.

All of my early flights were dune hops in 1980 as a Kitty Hawk student and instructor. I got tuned into lift and tug at maybe around the 75 mark and from that point on never once initiated a foot launch in which that check failed to occur within a couple seconds of commitment. It was never the slightest problem for me with any harness/glider combo in any conditions at any site.

And it always bothered me that there were some pilot/harness/glider combos for which it wasn't doable unassisted - Zack C for example. But I've somewhat recently come to think that we shouldn't be sweating the issue too much.

The key element is fear at the moment before commitment. If we're afraid of launching in potential plummet mode we're not gonna launch in potential plummet mode. Check just behind the ramp but keep the fear switch on. If the fear switch is on we're not gonna have either misplaced confidence in being safely connected or a false memory of the checks.

I didn't start doing preflight sidewire stomp tests until late in my game when I figured that the Wills Wing guys probably knew what they were talking about and I shouldn't be creeped out by the idea. But there were times before I'd gotten myself properly rebooted when I'd find myself on the cart and think, "Oops. I didn't run that check after I got everything tensioned." But then I'd remember that I HAD run the test last weekend before breakdown and that I hadn't abused any wires since. Good to go, will do better next time.

Unhooked launch is an impossibility and leg loops couldn't possibly matter when you're on a cart with your pod zipped up so my only threats are the focal point of the Dragonfly's safe towing system, some douchebag like Jim Keen-Intellect Rooney fixing whatever's going on back there, dust devils, and sidewires. And if I can't keep that much running in my head I shouldn't be launching 'cause there can be lotsa shit that needs to be dealt with for approach and landing and on a glider one may not have much say about when and/or where that happens.
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

Publishing some post Kunio traffic from an Arizona glider forum which - like at least one of the participants - no longer exists.

Up from right after the incident until some point in the past week I'd had in my head that:
He managed to climb up into the control frame and get his feet on the base bar.
was the actual scenario. Made it extra sad 'cause had that been accurate he should've come through smelling like a rose. And things could've ended as they did only if he'd stayed inside the control frame rather that relaxing, dropping his butt, flying the glider.

But:
- A Four would never have had the slightest problem monkey barring.
- Mark Johnson's account is contradicted by the reports:
-- Hal Hayden posted
-- what u$hPa published in the magazine 2009/03
- The contradicting accounts are more detailed and make way more sense.

http://ahga.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2860
Hal Hayden - 2008/08/31 14:06
AHGA Member

Mingus Accident Report
August 31, 2008
Arizona Hang Glider Association

Announcement:

A hang gliding accident occurred yesterday, August 30, on Mingus Mountain, near Prescott, that resulted in the death of Kunio Yoshimura of Phoenix.

The incident happened at approximately 1:30pm, when Yoshimuro launched his hang glider from the mountain without first attaching his harness to the glider. The pilot grabbed the glider's control bar and attempted to pull himself up onto it, but he was unable to gain control and the glider dove approximately 1,000 feet down the slope of the mountain. Yoshimura threw his parachute and let go of the glider before it impacted the hillside, but he was too low and the parachute failed to arrest his descent.

Pilots on launch called 911 to advise of the impact, while others scrambled down the hill to administer aid. More pilots, who had landed in the Cottonwood area and were monitoring the incident via radio, rushed to the impact site to assist. They were joined by personnel in an ambulance and a Cottonwood Fire Department vehicle. They bushwhacked through the thick brush on the hillside while a Department of Public Safety helicopter circled overhead. Upon reaching the pilot, CPR was administered, but the downed pilot could not be revived and emergency personnel subsequently pronounced him dead.

Mr. Yoshimura was an experienced pilot who was participating in the annual Mingus Fly-In, a three day event hosted by the Arizona Hang Glider Association. He was a resident of Phoenix and is survived by his wife, Karina, and children.

All questions regarding this incident should be directed to Hal Hayden, the Mingus Site Monitor for the AGHA, in Prescott at (928) 710-7701.
FlyingMJ - 2008/08/31 17:22
Phoenix
Posts: 1

Tribute to Friend - Kunio's Last Flight

I sent my personal account to Hal and he suggested I share it with the group. This is my first post on this forum so I hope I am doing it correctly.

Perhaps as my way of dealing with yesterday's events, and so that I would not have to tell the story again, as I can't seem to keep it together while doing so, and to tell the story, perhaps will cause us all to think and double check before flying, may help save one of us someday.

To Mark Knight, I want to tell you how proud I was of you, your efforts destroying your body to get to your friend were truly heroic. If I ever need help I hope your around. To Merrill, you truly are a good person and Kunio was very fortunate to have you as his friend. To everyone else this may reach who was involved in the recue attempt or comforting Kunio's family on launch, or in the coming weeks those willing to give financial or other support to Kunio's family, thank you for you efforts. There truly is no one more deserving and I know Kunio would be grateful.
Tribute to Friend - Kunio's Last Flight
Account by Mark Johnson

It was Saturday, August 30th 2008, less than 24 hours ago, yet with my foggy brain it seems both minutes and weeks ago at the same time. Trying to sleep last night was difficult, and filled with instant replays over and over. I just keep seeing him, hanging on, fighting for his life. Then I would wake up. Just a bad dream, I keep hoping...

I arrived at launch later than I had planned. Everyone had already launched and several hang gliders were scratching just over launch back and forth trying to get high enough to go over the back. The view from launch is breath-taking overlooking the valley, all green, and cumulus clouds forming over the valley, The cool wind blowing straight in with the scent of pine. It really is spectacular. Three pilots had just come back up after their morning flights and were busy setting up their gliders for another. Kunio was one of them. He was laughing, and getting ribbed for letting a bagger help setup his wing. I shook his hand and we chatted briefly. It was good to see him. He is always so nice to everyone. His wife and daughters were there and other family members. Camping at one of, if not the best spots in Arizona, Labor Day weekend, with his family, flying with his friends, just a perfect happy time for him.

Randy and Kunio were both ready to launch at the same time. Randy stepped up first and was talking to the guys at the LZ. Concerned about the landing wind conditions he was thinking whether or not he wanted to launch. Kunio was ready and in a hurry and decided to go to the north launch. I was with Mark Knight at the south launch holding wing wires and Mark Knight was holding nose wires waiting for Randy's decision. Both Mark and I wanted to see Kunio launch so as soon as we got someone to take our place, we started over. We had not gone 10' when I heard "Kunio just launched". I stopped and looked and got my first glance at him. Then all hell broke loose. "He's unhooked, shit..." Guys yelling at him over the radio to throw his chute, "Kunio don't think, throw your chute throw your chute". We all watch in horror not believing this was happening. Kunio was hanging on to the down tubes flying away from the mountain. He managed to climb up into the control frame and get his feet on the base bar. A sigh of relief came over me. I have seen guys fly from there before. I was hopeful, but Kunio was all over the place flying out of control, severe PIO from side to side. By now he was farther away and flying wildly making it harder to see what he was doing, getting closer to the ground. I can't imagine what was going through his mind. He then separated from his glider. I don't know if as he let go with one hand to throw his chute and the G force threw him out or maybe he was holding on and got thrown out, but he was falling and his chute was trying to open seconds before he hit. Had it been enough to slow him down. From above it looked like maybe it caught a tree, maybe it caught him. I was so hopeful, but in my heart I felt the worst.

As Mark Knight and I jumped in my truck to drive to the trail head, I could hear Kunio's kids crying, my heart sank even more, I felt sick. Had they just watched their dad fall to his death? I was nauseated and wanted to throw up. I told Mark Knight to just go but be careful, I would put together water, sleeping bag, straps, knife, anything I had that we might need and follow. Half way down the trail I was passed by Randy Skywalker (forgive me if I have or spelled his name wrong) and someone else I did not know. They were running full speed. I told them to be careful, because they can't help Kunio if they get hurt. They slowed down but were still moving fast. I was going as fast as I could carrying the stuff I had put together in both arms, wishing I had a backpack to put them in. I was sweating profusely, feeling sick, crying, praying, stopping to adjust the load, telling myself to keep going. The waves of emotion, thoughts of his wife and kids, my wife and kids, crying some more, then suck it up and keep moving. I had to get there as fast as I could safely to be able to do any good. I wished I was younger, faster, in better shape, legs burning, heart pounding, I just kept praying he was alive, keep moving.

It was so hard for me to tell where I was and where Kunio was from the trail. I keep looking up at launch and then down the mountain trying to figure out where he was. It was then I saw Mark Knight below. Then I heard "Hang on buddy". My heart jumped, was Mark close, was he talking to Kunio, if so he is alive. I wish I had a radio or something to find out what anyone knew. It had now been at least 45 minutes. Could he be alive? I was more optimistic, a new surge of energy, just in time as I was about to leave the trail and bushwhack through the most miserable dense stuff ever, wishing I had long pants and long sleeve shirt on. It was tearing me to pieces. Tune out the pain and keep moving safely, you must get to Kunio.

I could hear his vario so I new I was getting close to his glider. Coming up over a hill I got my first glimpse of his glider, upside, very eerie sight. 100' feet further down the hill I walked up to Merrill rolling up Kunio's parachute, "Merrill I am afraid to ask" "he shook his head.

Kunio looked so peaceful, all tucked into his harness. He looked like he was peacefully asleep. He died quick and painless, doing what he loved, just way before his time. This is such a bad dream I need to wake up. This can't be happening.

I will always remember Kunio as a gift to his family and all who knew him, and as one who loved to fly. I will add his name to my mental checklist as a reminder to double check, and whenever I fly I will think of him and take him with me in spirit.
aredryer - 2008/09/02 07:53
AHGA Member

Ditto

I have attempted this in practice and failed, even when I thought I was strong enough. The only way I could do it was to be on the base tube and to swing one leg up first. I have no idea if this would even be possible in flight because the dive is greater from the base. Once in a while I will climb into the frame while flying to practice controlling the glider that way. I know that this is stupid speculation but I'll ask anyway. WHAT IF he/we were to stay in the control frame all the way down if there was not time for a full chute deployment--would the impact velocity be less than opting for a jump. (this is not a comment about what he tried to do because from what I could tell his response was protocol.) Was his glider not able to be flown from the control frame?

May his family and friends find peace in this tragedy, and peace to each of you.

RDryer
Mark Knight - 2008/09/02 10:39
Tempe
AHGA Member

My thoughts are all over the place with constant rewinds and what if, why didn't Kunio and why didn't I? Dammit! I go back and forth between being pissed off and extremely sad by a stupid turn of events.

I just want to thank all who helped with a terrible situation. To all who pushed their way down the rocks and through the brush, Randy, Julian, Merle, Mark J, Gavin, and Jorge, those that hiked up to us. Bruce, Bill, Tim and the Guy with the Camera who I am forgetting your name, my apologies. Thanks to those on top and in the LZ who guided me to Kunio over the phone and comforted Karina as much as possible.

In the last 2 years Kunio became one of my best friends. I have a group of friends that my wife refers to as the "GIRLS" because we talk on the phone like a bunch of teenage girls. About a year ago my wife started referring to Kunio as one of the "GIRLS." Mark Johnson is also one of the Girls. His wife laughs at us also. I hope you all have friends like these. They are always there and I can depend on them for anything.

There's that movie in my head again. Why, Why, Why!

As you hung out and got to know Kunio, you found what a genuine person he was. I always said he had the smile of a three year old. You could not help but smile back. We laughed a lot.

He was a realtor and as you might have heard this is not necessarily the best business to be in at this time. He would get an extra commission or refund on a sale and he would always pass it on. He was in the process of selling his house to make ends meet last spring and he would still not take the money for himself. He would say, "These people need it more than I do. I will get through this."

He was father to three girls. One was his own with Karina and the other two were his nieces who had no father so he took the role because of how important he thought it was.

Some of you will remember the little girl that would accompany him to Shaw Butte or the Craters. I know her name but I am drawing a blank. She loved watching him fly. She wanted to learn to fly he said. I worry for her and Karina the most.

I feel we all as a group need to figure out what happened and what we are going to do to prevent it from ever happening again. I know I'm going to get two or three opinions and cause some arguments in the process. I don't care at this point. Old school, New school we are all in this. We do not need to discuss this now but get your thoughts together and write them down. In the near future we need to figure this out. Kunio was very close to my heart and I will get through this but I do not want to go through it again.

Thanks,
Mark Knight
Don - 2008/09/02 12:02
Long Beach
AHGA Member

Accidents

Mark,

I too lost a best friend on Friday - see the SHGA website/forum.

Jeff & I discussed coming to Mingus but I opted for the Owens instead and Jeff felt it was more than he was ready for (due to Jeff's death I did not go).

Kunio's accident was simple - he didn't perform a hang check!

I was taught to perform a "Hook-in Check" if I haven't checked in the last 30 seconds - I call it the "Joe Greblo Hook-in Check". Obviously Kunio didn't perform one of those either.

You can ask all you want - but based upon the write-ups I've read - he was in a hurry (moving to the North Launch rather than waiting for Randy to launch). I also assume that no one was at the North Launch to assist him - they might have noticed the situation.

Let's face it - when you are in a hurry - you make mistakes. In hindsight the question becomes - what was so damn important that he was in such a hurry?

About 4 weeks ago we had a similar situation at Kagel - A pilot hooked into the spreader bar on his hang strap. If he had done a hang check he was have seen/felt his error. Luckily the spreader bar slipped free of the hang strap as the glider lifted off and he fell only a couple of feet - if it had held even 3 - 5 seconds his fate would have been sealed.

Sorry for the loss and my sympathy to the family.

Like yourself - I have a memorial service to attend here in So. Cal.
diverdriver - 2008/09/02 16:25
Phoenix
AHGA Member

Kunio

An accident report was filed with the USHPA. We've lost a good one. Rest in peace Kunio.
Randy SkyWalker - 2008/09/02 17:12
Phoenix

FALLEN FEATHER

I was not fortunate enough to know Kunio as long as many who surrounded him during his life. However I was blessed to have spent the whole day with him August 30th and develop a bond that kept us close enough to be the last one to speak to him and hear his voice.

The movie that has played a million times in my mind and continues to roll is a guilt ridden series of avoidable and senseless errors.

He was not alone on launch nor where he fell, and although many believe it was the hurry and rush situation, I know for a fact it was not that "simple". Kunio was anxious to fly and with my help we assembled his glider to ready it for launch. After thorough pre-flight on his wing and choosing to go to the North launch he took meticulous attention and time to pick his cycle and his location on the launch. Yes a hang check should have been done, and during that time I should have noticed he was not hooked into his glider. He was so much better than this tragedy and I like to think we all are. Perhaps it is this lesson Kunio has given all of us who enjoy the freedom, and have the passion for flight to learn from.

I have lost friends in this lifestyle we all love, but this is without a doubt the most horrific and unforgettable tragedy of my flying career. We just can not continue to take for granted our experience and level of confidence. For our loved ones and our own safety we must teach ourselves to impliment a verbal check-list out loud when we pick up our wing with intentions to fly. Just like saying "CLEAR" before launch. This list should include but not be limited to, I am in leg loops, wing pre-flighted, parachute checked, radio checked, "I am hooked in ready to fly". I do not remember where I learned this because my brain is still scrambled from this tragedy.

I am not pushing anything here only planting a seed for thought. All I know is that I was not ready to finish my friendship with Kunio and I am not prepared to finish my friendship with the people who I know and care for. That is why I have written this post.

In my culture we have "dropped a feather" and it is time now to pray for Kunio, his children, Karina and family. As well as Mark Knight, Julian, Merle, Bruce, Mark Johnson, and the many people who assisted us on the mountain that day. Please forgive me for not mentioning everyones name I am still a mess and I will miss Kunio eternally.

Randy SkyWalker
http://american-indian-air-force.blogspot.com/
Hal Hayden - 2008/09/02 20:46
AHGA Member

Randy -

Thanks for your thoughts on this accident. I must ask, however, why you would propose a verbal checklist when a written checklist is so much more reliable.

Dan Schroeder has created and distributed a great device for attaching a written checklist that hangs from the nose of the glider and is almost impossible to miss before launching. On Saturday I saw only 2 other people besides myself using this (Bill and Bruce) and wondered for the umpteenth time why our pilot community has not adopted this very easy and reliable method of ensuring safe launches.

I've discussed this with pilots many times and received a myriad of reasons why people do not use it. The fact remains, however, that every other form of aviation utilizes checklists to be sure they have not missed anything before they take off. I have been flying sailplanes and airplanes since I was 14 years old and have over 2000 hours in the air altogether. I still go through a checklist before I launch every time.

Do hang glider pilots think they are above this procedure or what? If you think I'm being pedantic, think about this. You just went to the trouble to make and install a beautiful plaque in front of the HG launch at Mingus that says "HOOK IN". How much good do it do Kunio? None - he got impatient and moved to the new North launch without hooking in.

If every pilot would slow down, never move their glider without hooking in, do an immediate "pull-through" check before picking up the glider and then a hang-check before stepping up to launch, we could eliminate the possibility of another accident like this.

Sorry to be so blunt about this, but it needs to be said. If I see you hooking in on launch without looking at a checklist, you can expect me to give you some shit about it.

Hal Hayden
SCOTT C. - 2008/09/02 21:21
Arizona
AHGA Member

Hal, I have used the "VISUAL AND VERBAL" checklist for many years and it was a big part of my lesson plan with all of my students. IT WORKS.

Why it works you ask, When you verbaly repete your check list everybody within earshot tunes into what your doing and starts visualy checking the items you verbaly announce and in most cases starts looking at things around you while you are sounding off your check list.

I also verbaly read checklists in aircraft . Its my opinion that simply reading and looking leaves out a third party back up.

When you read your check list to yourself you leave it up to yourself . When you make a mistake you have no back up.

When you verbalise you communicate.
Randy SkyWalker - 2008/09/03 00:14

Hal,

No disrespect to your experience or qualificatins, in fact the written check list is also a good idea (obviously if airplane pilots use it) and anything that can save one of our own from harm I support. I have used the verbal announcment for years and as Scott said it gets attention brought to these items by all that are in earshot and gets everyone alert to your intentions. It also creates a communication habbit for yourself whether you are in your glider that has the written list hanging infront of you, or a different glider which might not have that list.

You ask if "hang glider pilots think they are above this procedure"? I cant speak for everyone, but I know there are many pilots that can benefit from all of our experiences when offered in a helpful, noncondescending and comprehesive manner.

You refer to the beautiful plaque I installed as "trouble to make and install" when in fact if it saves one person from harm I have accomplished what I set out to do. As I stated previously, Kunio's fate was not decided because of a "impatients". He just did not have a functional checklist be it written, or verbal.

I have been a monitor at Yosemite for years and if you try to walk out on that rock hooked in on my watch or with any other monitor you will find you wont get past the first step because of safety protocol. My point is it is not alway prudent or wise to hook in "everytime" you move your glider.

As you said slowing down and doing a pulling through needs to be part of everyones system but I remain firm that checklist's are imperative and we need to impliment them at all times.
Airparamo - 2008/09/03 11:13
Maricopa
Glider Type: I go both ways
Joined: 2008/09/03
Posts: 1

Kunio

I feel particularly at a loss since I did know Kunio, even if only as an acquaintance. I had met him a few times at AHGA meetings here in Phoenix, and when I saw him at Mingus Mountain on Friday, he instantly remembered me, as I did him, and we warmly shock hands. I still remember seeing him walking and smiling at the top of Mingus Mountain when I was there on Friday. I did fly on Friday at Mingus, a nice, very long sled ride on my paraglider. And then I left to meet up with other paraglider pilots guys at Sheba. It was later the next day when I heard the tragic news.

I have read several reports on Kunio's death and it appeared he made a number of very basic mistakes. The first and most important was a hurry to get in the air. I admit, I have done this myself more than once and noticed that hurrying can cause me to oversee basic or obvious problems and not double check important steps. This can be difficult to overcome, especially when the conditions are perfect, the air is calling you to fly, and family, friends and spectators are watching. In Kunio's case, he simply forgot to hook in. This would have quickly been caught by quick prelaunch check. Unfortunately, it is reminders like these that cause me to reflect how precious life is and to treat it with care, to double check the critical areas, and keep sharp on the potential areas of danger. All the posts here are a fresh reminder to me to stay sharp and not hurry into the air needlessly.

The other side of this, which I can strongly relate to, is that Kunio had a wife and 3 daughters and many friends. To me, the most difficult part of this event is that they witnessed their husband/father/close friend struggling to save his life as he fell thousands of feet to his death. I can not imagine how you/they must be now emotionally, and my thoughts and prays go out to you/them all.

Mo

Mo Sheldon
Airparamo - Fly Like A Bird
http://www.airparamo.com/
602-692-7995
NMERider - 2008/09/03 14:25
Posts: 2

Checklist Device?

My deepest heartfelt sympathies go out to Kunio Yoshimura's wife and children and to all of his friends and comrades in the AHGA. I only recently returned to this wonderful sport after a 26 year sabbatical only to have 3 hang gliding and 1 PG fatality in the SoCal area in very short order, and one suicide to really ice the cake from which I have no desire to eat. During that intervening time I did a fair amount of bicycling only to lose friends and one family member to vehicular collisions. At least in hang gliding we have just the dignity of dying by our own hand rather than the ignominy of falling to the negligence and carelessness of some stranger.

The last and only time I ever launched without hooking in was ~ 1978 and luckily I just cartwheeled down a snow covered slope and dislocated a finger that I reset with a quick jerk of the other hand.

I would like to learn more about the checklist and device that Hal Hayden mentions was created by Dan Schroeder. Can someone please enlighten me and perhaps others on this?

Thank You,
Jonathan

<edit> Hal graciously set me his check list which I converted to pdf and bordered to print onto a 5x7 card: http://www.hanggliding.org/download.php?id=7461
SETUP
Assemble Control Frame - Stand up & open glider half way - Put nose battens in place - Align battens - Insert first 3 battens - Fully spread wings - Tension backhaul & kingpost - Install outer traverse - battens - Install tip wands - Install remaining top battens - Open & re-close velcro tips - Check sprog hardware - Check all internal ribs - Check crossbar junctions - Deploy sprogs and zip - Attach nose wires - Inspect inside of sail - Cross bars - VG line & pulleys - Internal velcros - Hang loops - Check VG operation - Set VG tight - Zip up sail - Install nose cone - Set VG loose - Install bottom battens

PRE-FLIGHT
Inspect control frame attachment - Leading edges - Kingpost - Wingtips - Trailing edges - Haulback - Vario & GPS set - Batteries - Smoke bomb - Radio set & locked - Phone / Hat - Camelback / O2 - Harness check - Biner / Chute - Pitch adjuster

PRE-LAUNCH
2 leg loops - Front entry buckle - Pod zipper set - Hook knife - Chute ready - Camelback tube - Helmet latched - Radio check - Gloves - Hook in - VG line clear - HANG CHECK
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

2008/08/30 Kunio Yoshimura report from the magazine. Will dissect in the next post.
2009/03
Analysis | Preparedness | Incidents
---
SafetyBULLETIN
---
This column contains a summary of a report of a pilot who fell from his glider immediately after launching. Failure-to-hook-in accidents were once far more common. We include this summary in the hopes of reducing this type of accident to zero.
---
Mingus Mountain, AZ - 2008/08/30 13:30
PILOT: 36 year old male, H-4 with a long break in activity
GLIDER: Moyes LightSpeed
HARNESS: Moyes Matrix
HELMET: Icaro full-face w/visor
---
SUMMARY: An experienced advanced-rated pilot, flying the mountains after an eight-year long hiatus, fell from the glider after launching unhooked. The pilot attempted multiple times to climb up into the control frame, then released from the glider at about 100 ft AGL, and threw his parachute while falling. The accident pilot did not survive the fall.

CONDITIONS: Conditions at the time of the accident were described as favorable. One pilot, launching at the time of the accident, delayed due to reports of occasional turbulence in the LZ.

LOGBOOK: The accident pilot was reported to be an experienced advanced-rated pilot with approximately 100 hours total time and 100 flights. He had recently ended an eight-year hiatus from hang glider flying.

The accident pilot received his intermediate rating in 1994 and his advanced rating in February 2008.

MEDICAL: There were no known pre-existing physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight.

SYNOPSIS: The accident pilot had completed a successful flight from the mountain earlier in the day. After arriving back on top and seeing conditions favorable for another flight, he, along with one other pilot, quickly set up his glider. The accident pilot, who was described as exuberant, was reportedly advised by others to "slow down." The other pilot had set up first and taken the number one position for the traditional hang glider launch. The accident pilot had one experienced hang glider pilot on his nose wires, who queried the first pilot to see if he was ready to launch. The response was that he was contemplating his launch, as the conditions in the LZ were reported to be turbulent at times. The accident pilot then decided to move to a different launch that had recently been constructed. Primarily intended for paraglider launches, it had been successfully flown by hang gliders; in fact, it had been created with a section expressly designed to accommodate hang glider launches. While the nose wires were being held by the first pilot, the accident pilot moved into position at the second launch. Another experienced hang glider pilot as well as a paraglider pilot also joined the launch crew.

After waiting for several minutes, a launch-cycle was called by the nose person. The accident pilot then launched, un-hooked, into the cycle. Emergency 911 was called. The accident pilot was observed immediately trying to climb into the control frame. He managed to get one knee over the bar, but the glider began to gyrate and dive, causing him to fall off the base tube.

Repeated attempts to climb into the control frame proved impossible, as the glider continued to gyrate violently. The pilot was soon observed falling from the glider at the same time the parachute was thrown. The glider's altitude at this time was estimated to be 75 to 100 ft. above the ground. The parachute only opened partially before the accident pilot impacted the mountainside. Several pilots on the scene rushed to the crash site, arriving within half-an-hour, and attempted CPR. But the pilot was most likely killed on impact. Emergency personnel were able to reach the pilot after approximately another hour, whereupon he was declared deceased.

AIRFRAME: A detailed damage description was not available. All damage to the glider was consistent with ground impact. The hang-strap was intact, and the carabiner was still clipped to the harness under the pilot's arm.

PARACHUTE: The accident pilot was using a Quantum 330 reserve parachute at the time of the accident. The type, style, and size of reserve used were not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident.

HELMET: The accident pilot was using a full-face hang-glider-style helmet at the time of the accident. The type and style of helmet used was not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident. The helmet (Icaro) was intact for the most part. The chin guard failed as designed in a full frontal impact.

ANALYSIS: No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis of this accident. There was no physical evidence indicating any failure of the glider or harness during or after the launch. An examination of the pilot's flight deck revealed that the pilot, apparently in his haste to pack up and fly again, failed to switch the instrument off after his earlier landing on the day of the accident. The barograph feature of his instrument (FlyTec 4030 Race) was not turned on.

Eyewitness statements all agree that the pilot initiated his launch while un-hooked from the glider. As the glider lifted, the accident pilot attempted to hold on and climb into the control frame. The extreme nosedown input this introduced would have caused the glider to fly very fast. Additionally, it would have been difficult-to-impossible to maintain stable roll-control under these conditions. As a result, the glider became unstable in flight. It is likely that the accident pilot recognized too late that the situation was quickly getting out of control and attempted to throw his parachute as he let go of the glider. Given his low altitude, the parachute did not have time to fully deploy before impact with the ground.

PROBABLE CAUSE: Failure to hook-in prior to launch. Failure to accomplish a successful hang-check just prior to launching.

DISCUSSION: This particular hook-in failure is disturbing due to the fact that there were several people observing, including experienced hang glider pilots who were in attendance on his wing. As with all serious accidents, an unbroken chain of unfortunate events were required to enable this tragic outcome, including:
a) The accident pilot was excited from his prior successful flight and was rushing to get back into the air.
b) The traditional hang gliding launch was not utilized. A ritual is more or less followed when using this launch that facilitates a hangcheck, since the launching pilot must climb up to launch, making his or her hang strap/straps readily visible to someone in front of him.
c) Those pilots observing the launch assumed that the accident pilot was hooked-in.
d) No hang-check was asked for, nor was one offered.


RECOMMENDATIONS: Always accomplish a good hang-check JUST prior to launching. Make effective use of your wire crew to assist in the completion of all individual pre-flight checks.

DISCUSSION: The pilot-in-command of any aircraft bears full responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight. Hang gliders are almost always broken down for storage and transport and flown immediately after re-assembly at the new launch site. Such operations place an extreme premium on pre-flight checks to ensure that the aircraft is properly assembled and airworthy for flight. The common practice of donning the harness while waiting to launch and hooking in just prior to flight, ups the ante even more. By analogy, this would be like a general aviation pilot walking around the tarmac while wearing his/her cockpit as he prepares for flight, and hooks up the wings of his aircraft just prior to taking the runway. Viewed in this way, the supreme importance of a pre-flight hang-check accomplished JUST PRIOR to flight is made clear.

Redundancy is a key safety principle when it comes to aviation. Single-point failures can be deadly. Critical safety-of-flight items like being hooked-in should be checked multiple times (redundancy in time) and by more than one individual (redundancy in space). Every pilot should build into his preflight checklist at least two checklist items verifying that he is properly clipped into the glider. Every pilot should utilize any wire crew available to assist in verifying that he is clipped into the glider properly. The final check should be accomplished as soon as practicable prior to launching - to reduce the chances of compromising the configuration prior to flight.

Launching unhooked at a cliff-launch, or any other site that does not involve a shallow grass-covered slope, is every hang glider pilot's worst nightmare. Given the control frame configuration of most higher performance hang gliders, the ability to fly safely while hanging from the basetube is severely compromised. A modern hand-thrown reserve system requires a significant amount of altitude (see manufacturer documentation) above the ground to fully deploy. Speed through the air can significantly reduce this deployment time and the altitude required. The fact-of-the-matter is that depending on the site being flown, launching unhooked is a very low-survivability event. There is very little the pilot can do to survive the incident once the launch has been initiated. The best course of action is to ensure that the pilot is properly hooked-in prior to flight.
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oi-fgK3ZqPE
Mingus Mountain Site Intro June 2014 - An AZHPA Hang Gliding and Paragliding film by Greg Porter
Pretty cool scene-of-the-crime video from half a dozen years later.

01-00919
- 01 - chronological order
- -0 - minutes
- 09 - seconds
- 30 - frame (30 fps)

01-00919
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34°42'09.03" N 112°06'58.39" W

07-03902
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If you're gonna do an unhooked launch from either of these ramps it's pretty much a cliff situation if you've gotten the least bit airborne. That's a real serious escarpment.

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James from Prescott:

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Randy Buell:

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Jeff B. Johnson:

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Bill Comstock:

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When Kunio launched on 2008/08/30 (for the second and last time) there were fly-in participants in the LZ who became involved in the response. The LZ being used was the Tenth Street - 34°44'51.95" N 112°01'14.65" W. I'd already had it from Greg Porter's 2013/08/02 missed leg loops launch:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3UbztgTtsc

71-71616
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(landing to the ESE / toward the baseball fields) but figured I might save fifteen seconds just doing a web search. Came up with:

Hal Hayden - 2010/08/22 00:10 UTC

Hang Gliding from Mingus Mountain

This was the first video I made of a hang glider flight with the GoPro. It is just a short flight to the 10th Street landing zone in Cottonwood.
And started trying to match landmarks with what Google Earth was giving be. With everything I was sure I had I couldn't get the orientation to work, figured no, would try something else.

Took me about a half hour to realize that the video was flipped horizontally / mirror imaging.

(In the last photo - 26-41616 - the LZ is a wee bit aft of straight down from the glider and about three hundred yards this side of the Verde River. (Visible clearing.))
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

Sorry, THIS next post.
2009/03
Analysis | Preparedness | Incidents
---
SafetyBULLETIN
---
This column contains a summary of a report of a pilot who fell from his glider immediately after launching. Failure-to-hook-in accidents were once far more common. We include this summary in the hopes of reducing this type of accident to zero.
---
Mingus Mountain, AZ - 2008/08/30 13:30
PILOT: 36 year old male, H-4 with a long break in activity
GLIDER: Moyes LightSpeed
HARNESS: Moyes Matrix
HELMET: Icaro full-face w/visor
---
SUMMARY: An experienced advanced-rated pilot, flying the mountains after an eight-year long hiatus, fell from the glider after launching unhooked. The pilot attempted multiple times to climb up into the control frame, then released from the glider at about 100 ft AGL, and threw his parachute while falling. The accident pilot did not survive the fall.

CONDITIONS: Conditions at the time of the accident were described as favorable. One pilot, launching at the time of the accident, delayed due to reports of occasional turbulence in the LZ.

LOGBOOK: The accident pilot was reported to be an experienced advanced-rated pilot with approximately 100 hours total time and 100 flights. He had recently ended an eight-year hiatus from hang glider flying.

The accident pilot received his intermediate rating in 1994 and his advanced rating in February 2008.

MEDICAL: There were no known pre-existing physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight.

SYNOPSIS: The accident pilot had completed a successful flight from the mountain earlier in the day. After arriving back on top and seeing conditions favorable for another flight, he, along with one other pilot, quickly set up his glider. The accident pilot, who was described as exuberant, was reportedly advised by others to "slow down." The other pilot had set up first and taken the number one position for the traditional hang glider launch. The accident pilot had one experienced hang glider pilot on his nose wires, who queried the first pilot to see if he was ready to launch. The response was that he was contemplating his launch, as the conditions in the LZ were reported to be turbulent at times. The accident pilot then decided to move to a different launch that had recently been constructed. Primarily intended for paraglider launches, it had been successfully flown by hang gliders; in fact, it had been created with a section expressly designed to accommodate hang glider launches. While the nose wires were being held by the first pilot, the accident pilot moved into position at the second launch. Another experienced hang glider pilot as well as a paraglider pilot also joined the launch crew.

After waiting for several minutes, a launch-cycle was called by the nose person. The accident pilot then launched, un-hooked, into the cycle. Emergency 911 was called. The accident pilot was observed immediately trying to climb into the control frame. He managed to get one knee over the bar, but the glider began to gyrate and dive, causing him to fall off the base tube.

Repeated attempts to climb into the control frame proved impossible, as the glider continued to gyrate violently. The pilot was soon observed falling from the glider at the same time the parachute was thrown. The glider's altitude at this time was estimated to be 75 to 100 ft. above the ground. The parachute only opened partially before the accident pilot impacted the mountainside. Several pilots on the scene rushed to the crash site, arriving within half-an-hour, and attempted CPR. But the pilot was most likely killed on impact. Emergency personnel were able to reach the pilot after approximately another hour, whereupon he was declared deceased.

AIRFRAME: A detailed damage description was not available. All damage to the glider was consistent with ground impact. The hang-strap was intact, and the carabiner was still clipped to the harness under the pilot's arm.

PARACHUTE: The accident pilot was using a Quantum 330 reserve parachute at the time of the accident. The type, style, and size of reserve used were not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident.

HELMET: The accident pilot was using a full-face hang-glider-style helmet at the time of the accident. The type and style of helmet used was not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident. The helmet (Icaro) was intact for the most part. The chin guard failed as designed in a full frontal impact.

ANALYSIS: No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis of this accident. There was no physical evidence indicating any failure of the glider or harness during or after the launch. An examination of the pilot's flight deck revealed that the pilot, apparently in his haste to pack up and fly again, failed to switch the instrument off after his earlier landing on the day of the accident. The barograph feature of his instrument (FlyTec 4030 Race) was not turned on.

Eyewitness statements all agree that the pilot initiated his launch while un-hooked from the glider. As the glider lifted, the accident pilot attempted to hold on and climb into the control frame. The extreme nosedown input this introduced would have caused the glider to fly very fast. Additionally, it would have been difficult-to-impossible to maintain stable roll-control under these conditions. As a result, the glider became unstable in flight. It is likely that the accident pilot recognized too late that the situation was quickly getting out of control and attempted to throw his parachute as he let go of the glider. Given his low altitude, the parachute did not have time to fully deploy before impact with the ground.

PROBABLE CAUSE: Failure to hook-in prior to launch. Failure to accomplish a successful hang-check just prior to launching.

DISCUSSION: This particular hook-in failure is disturbing due to the fact that there were several people observing, including experienced hang glider pilots who were in attendance on his wing. As with all serious accidents, an unbroken chain of unfortunate events were required to enable this tragic outcome, including:
a) The accident pilot was excited from his prior successful flight and was rushing to get back into the air.
b) The traditional hang gliding launch was not utilized. A ritual is more or less followed when using this launch that facilitates a hangcheck, since the launching pilot must climb up to launch, making his or her hang strap/straps readily visible to someone in front of him.
c) Those pilots observing the launch assumed that the accident pilot was hooked-in.
d) No hang-check was asked for, nor was one offered.


RECOMMENDATIONS: Always accomplish a good hang-check JUST prior to launching. Make effective use of your wire crew to assist in the completion of all individual pre-flight checks.

DISCUSSION: The pilot-in-command of any aircraft bears full responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight. Hang gliders are almost always broken down for storage and transport and flown immediately after re-assembly at the new launch site. Such operations place an extreme premium on pre-flight checks to ensure that the aircraft is properly assembled and airworthy for flight. The common practice of donning the harness while waiting to launch and hooking in just prior to flight, ups the ante even more. By analogy, this would be like a general aviation pilot walking around the tarmac while wearing his/her cockpit as he prepares for flight, and hooks up the wings of his aircraft just prior to taking the runway. Viewed in this way, the supreme importance of a pre-flight hang-check accomplished JUST PRIOR to flight is made clear.

Redundancy is a key safety principle when it comes to aviation. Single-point failures can be deadly. Critical safety-of-flight items like being hooked-in should be checked multiple times (redundancy in time) and by more than one individual (redundancy in space). Every pilot should build into his preflight checklist at least two checklist items verifying that he is properly clipped into the glider. Every pilot should utilize any wire crew available to assist in verifying that he is clipped into the glider properly. The final check should be accomplished as soon as practicable prior to launching - to reduce the chances of compromising the configuration prior to flight.

Launching unhooked at a cliff-launch, or any other site that does not involve a shallow grass-covered slope, is every hang glider pilot's worst nightmare. Given the control frame configuration of most higher performance hang gliders, the ability to fly safely while hanging from the basetube is severely compromised. A modern hand-thrown reserve system requires a significant amount of altitude (see manufacturer documentation) above the ground to fully deploy. Speed through the air can significantly reduce this deployment time and the altitude required. The fact-of-the-matter is that depending on the site being flown, launching unhooked is a very low-survivability event. There is very little the pilot can do to survive the incident once the launch has been initiated. The best course of action is to ensure that the pilot is properly hooked-in prior to flight.
2009/03
Analysis | Preparedness | Incidents
No name on it, Joe? That's OK, it has your sticky fingerprints all over it. And yeah, if I were writing corporate cover-up crap like this - in return for what I haven't the slightest clue - I wouldn't want my name connected to it either.
SafetyBULLETIN
---
This column contains a summary of a report...
What was it in the original full report you didn't want us to see?
..of a pilot...
Bit of a stretch designating someone not hooked in, desperately trying to climb back up into the control frame, oscillating his way down the slope a pilot.
...who fell from his glider immediately after launching.
I think you have him confused with Bill Priday. I'd guess Kunio was able to stay with the glider for a mile or over. But if you're just writing total crap anyway it probably doesn't really matter.
Failure-to-hook-in accidents were once far more common.
1. Hang gliding was once far more common.

2. Go fuck yourself. Nobody has the slightest clue what we're having in the way of unhooked launch incidents. We tend to hear about them only when there are fatal or other serious consequences.

On probably 2005/09/17 Bill Priday was stopped en route to launch at the south McConnellsburg ramp unhooked and obviously assuming he wasn't and intending to launch sans verification effort. We heard about that incident ONLY after and because he was killed running off a cliff unconnected two weeks later. (And if the McConnellsburg incident had been reported there'd have been a greater probability that one of the relevant Whitwell douchebags would've looked to see if he was actually connected.)

And on 2020/10/03 we had an unhooked launch at a 2800 foot vertical site that was safely aborted but could easily have been just as fatal as Bill's and Kunio's were. It was reported on the Grebloville rag at the time but now exists only on Kite Strings. (Also not on Davis, Jack, Bob, Colorado, Capitol.) Yeah, that's another good way to get your unhooked launch stats down near to where you want them and show what great jobs are being done by everyone.

3. The rate of unhooked launch incidents will always remain fairly constant as long as the bullshit strategies for preventing them are pursued by the masses.
We...
We the fuck WHO? You won't even identify your self/selves. Why should we give a rat's ass about your perspectives, recommendations?
...include this summary...
A SUMMARY? What are we leaving out? This guy's life wasn't important enough for every last punctuation mark to be included?

Oh well, silver lining... At least if it's a summary we know that every word will count. You won't burden us with shitloads of useless irrelevant crap about the suitability of the HG only and HG/PG launches for the execution of hang checks, what Kunio was using for a helmet and parachute, known medical issues, the condition of the glider pre launch and post impact, glider gyrations, track logs, the conditions at the time in the LZ, CPR efforts, 911 response, condition of the glider post impact... There's a lot to be said for a nice concise report that covers all the significant issues.
...in the hopes of reducing this type of accident to zero.
By saying and doing the same things over and over again. I can hardly wait. Me... My hopes are that we'll reduce this type of a bullshit incident report to zero - the way things were back in the days of R.V. Wills and Doug Hildreth.
Mingus Mountain, AZ - 2008/08/30 13:30
PILOT: 36 year old male, H-4 with a long break in activity
1. Pity he wasn't more current. Unhooked launches hardly ever occur within the regular flyer crowd.

2. Wanna tell us exactly WHEN the long break in activity break in activity was? In the months prior to his final launch effort we have him flying at Miller Canyon, Shaw Butte, Mingus, Casa Grande for an AT clinic and the Santa Cruz Flats Race. He was as current and up to speed as any recreational Four you wanna name.
GLIDER: Moyes LightSpeed
1. It's actually a Litespeed. But do feel free to lecture us on the importance of final checks prior to commitment anyway.
2. What does Bill Moyes have to say on this issue?
LITESPEED RS OWNERS MANUAL

As you should have already attached your harness to the glider, check that it is set up correctly. Ensure that your parachute is well maintained and stowed appropriately and that the bridle runs cleanly to the carabineer which is attached vertically to the hang loop. If your harness height from base bar needs adjustment, it is best to acquire the correct length loop from your Moyes dealer.
Oh. The harness is already attached to the glider. Problem solved then. (Too fuckin' stupid to either be able to spell "carabiner" or run a spellcheck on a document that's gonna be read by thousands of customers for eons to come.)
HARNESS: Moyes Matrix
Already attached to the glider. Pray continue.
HELMET: Icaro full-face w/visor
Probably needed something more substantial.
SUMMARY: An experienced advanced-rated pilot...
Signed off by whom? From One to Four. How come nobody's coming forward telling us what great jobs they did bulletproofing Kunio on this issue?
...flying the mountains after an eight-year long hiatus...
1. Yeah. Got his Four in February 2008, "flying the mountainS" PLURAL, no mention of the AT flying... But let's play the hiatus angle for all it's worth.

2. Tell me how "currency" correlates to the least degree to unhooked launch incidents. If I were putting money on things I'd say the actual long hiatus guys would be LESS likely to launch unhooked. And I'd win with Kunio. His previous launch and flight was flawless and executed probably no more than two hours before. (And if this report weren't the crap it is we'd have a good approximation of that launch time.)
...fell from the glider after launching unhooked. The pilot attempted multiple times to climb up into the control frame...
We had a report that he WAS able to climb into the control frame - a report that was NEVER retracted or contradicted. Something on the order of "Despite one report to the contrary..." But this is just a SUMMARY so I guess it's not worth the space to give us an unambiguous clarification on the issue.
...then released from the glider...
He released from the glider? He could've stayed with it but he had a better plan?
...at about 100 ft AGL...
At about a hundred feet.
...and threw his parachute while falling.
And then he threw his chute. He figured that would be a better plan than throwing his chute while he was still hanging onto his glider.

Bullshit. From Mark Johnson's report:
I don't know if as he let go with one hand to throw his chute and the G force threw him out or maybe he was holding on and got thrown out, but he was falling and his chute was trying to open seconds before he hit.
Nobody knew or will ever know exactly what happened on that sequence. But thanks anyway for another confirmation of what we already know about your credibility and ethics.
The accident pilot did not survive the fall.
He survived the fall in totally pristine shape. It was the impact that was the problem.
CONDITIONS: Conditions at the time of the accident were described as favorable.
1. Pity they weren't unfavorable. Tailing from ten to fifteen he'd have almost certainly made it through the afternoon totally unscathed.

2. Oh, the conditions at the time of the accident were described as FAVORABLE. At Whitwell as Bill Priday was about to buy it the
Winds were SSE at 5-7, essentially straight in and light.
but here at this fatal the conditions were FAVORABLE. Well, "DESCRIBED AS" anyway. And by whom we're not really sure but I guess that's the best we're able to do on this one. And gawd, what a bozo this guy must've been to launch unhooked in conditions which, at the time of the accident, were described as favorable by someone.

Here's what we actually have:
Mark Johnson - 2008/08/31 17:22

I arrived at launch later than I had planned. Everyone had already launched and several hang gliders were scratching just over launch back and forth trying to get high enough to go over the back. The view from launch is breath-taking overlooking the valley, all green, and cumulus clouds forming over the valley, The cool wind blowing straight in with the scent of pine. It really is spectacular.
Randy SkyWalker - 2008/09/02 17:12

Kunio was anxious to fly and with my help we assembled his glider to ready it for launch. After thorough pre-flight on his wing and choosing to go to the North launch he took meticulous attention and time to pick his cycle and his location on the launch.
And that Randy was on his nose and a para and a hang were on his wings.

From that we know that there was a moderate ambient SE wind - 10-12 maybe - and that strongish thermal cycles were coming through. And that tells us that if Kunio and his crew had just let the glider float - which would've been good practice regardless...
One pilot, launching at the time of the accident, delayed due to reports of occasional turbulence in the LZ.
1. Yeah, that makes lotsa sense. He was launching AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT but he DELAYED due to reports of occasional turbulence in the LZ (six and a quarter miles away in Cottonwood at the Tenth Street LZ (34°44'51.95" N 112°01'14.65" W)). Then, while Kunio was oscillating down the slope hanging off of his basetube, he (Randy SkyWalker (son of Eves Tall Chief)) radioed back down to the LZ, things had smoothed out, and he had a nice clean launch.

2. We want to thermal - 'specially at Mingus. A report of "occasional turbulence" in the LZ is nothing but encouragement to launch.

3. What he was ACTUALLY talking and concerned about was wind conditions in the LZ. (Though it's hard to imagine why.)

4. Guess what... He didn't launch.

5. Wow, that sure was useful information. We'd much rather you water the report down with crap like that than hear who his instructors were and what they were teaching to deal with the unhooked launch issue, what procedures "the accident pilot" normally employed.
LOGBOOK: The accident pilot was reported to be an experienced advanced-rated pilot with approximately 100 hours total time and 100 flights.
Oh.

- He was a Four with a hundred flights. In the 2006/10 SOPs you needed a minimum of two and a half times that. So who signed him off and how much was he paid?

- He had a career average - from Zero to and a bit beyond Four - of an hour per flight. Not totally outlandish but bloody unlikely.

If you had his LOGBOOK then how come you're telling us APPROXIMATELY what he had in terms of airtime and flights?
He had recently ended an eight-year hiatus from hang glider flying.
Well, that's about all we need to know about his currency. And it would probably be a good idea for us after eight-year hiatuses to limit our foot launches to shallow slope environments for a fair bit.
The accident pilot received his intermediate rating in 1994 and his advanced rating in February 2008.
1. From whom? And any thoughts on why neither of them has identified himself and commented on this incident? Maybe something on the order of:

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1166
Thoughts on responsibility...
Scott Wilkinson - 2005/10/05 14:10:56 UTC

We visited Steve Wendt yesterday, who was visibly choked up over Bill's death. For Steve, it all comes down to one thing: you've got to hook in. Period.
2. Oh. He scored his Four something over six months prior to his final flight. In six months with good flying opportunities one could easily go from Zero to Three. (As mostly a Kitty Hawk instructor I did it in about four and a half - if you take out the no-possession-of-glider intervals.) But let's throw this "long hiatus" bullshit into the mix - while conspicuously omitting all the recent experience he's been documented to have had - to plant the idea that this one was somehow related to currency.

And this from an organization in which your pilot currency is maintained solely by payment of membership dues.
MEDICAL: There were no known pre-existing physical conditions or illnesses prior to the accident flight.
And he looked so peaceful subsequent to it.
SYNOPSIS: The accident pilot had completed a successful flight from the mountain earlier in the day.
Connected himself to his glider, launched, flew, approached, landed fine after recently ending an eight-year hiatus from hang glider flying. Things didn't go south until after he'd had that practice. Probably a lesson for us all somewhere in that.
After arriving back on top and seeing conditions favorable for another flight...
But not landing - 'cause of the occasional turbulence in the LZ.
...he, along with one other pilot, quickly set up his glider.
1. Pick one. Kunio:
- and the other pilot were both quickly setting up their own gliders.
- was quickly setting up his own glider with help from another pilot.
No wait... This is just a summary so you really don't need to clarify issues like that.

2. The implication being that Kunio and the other pilot were in rush mode and that that was a factor in the unhooked launch. So how come we didn't hear about any upper surface battens left untensioned, undersurface battens less than fully inserted, sail zippers with another inch to go? They set up the glider quickly, efficiently, competently; stowed the cover bags; no mistakes before getting to position on the north launch with three crewmen.
The accident pilot, who was described as exuberant...
Note to self... Avoid exuberance.
...was reportedly advised by others to "slow down."
1. Yeah, that was the problem. He was moving too fast.

2. What was he reportedly advised by others to do with regard to verifying that he was connected to his glider before committing?

3. Pity none of these other slow moving pilots moved quickly enough to check his connection status before he went off the ramp.

4. Name some consequential errors one might commit as a consequence of a rush to set up and launch. I can think of:
- sidewire with concealed corrosion damage
- missed leg loops
- partial hook-in
- failure to hook in

If people were concerned about him not being safely prepped for launch how much extra effort would it have been to have just one individual verify that he was good on all four issues?

Glider people are never gonna deal with the first one 'cause they're incapable of doing a stomp test without grinding the wire into a sharp rock - even if it takes them an hour and a half to find a suitable sharp rock - so let's cross it off the list and settle for killing a Rafi Lavin once every twenty years.

Kunio had three individuals with him anyway for wire crew. And all of them were way better positioned to visually verify the connection than Kunio was but nobody could be bothered to? I guess self regulated means you just tell other people to slow down and make sure they get hang checks - and if anyone launches unhooked it's HIS problem. ('Cept that was the end of the fly-in and a lot of participants were traumatized for life.)

6. 'Cept the rush crap is a total mischaracterization of what was going on and how things developed. But I guess you only published what you could get that fit neatly into the u$hPa certified narrative. You report nothing substantive other than the failure to hook in.
The other pilot...
Randy.
...had set up first...
All by himself - you don't say anything about him having had assistance.
...and taken the number one position for the traditional hang glider launch.
Tradition. The mainstay of hang gliding culture.
The accident pilot had one experienced hang glider pilot on his nose wires...
How come we don't get to hear any more about him beyond him being experienced? He might have gotten all his experience at Phoenix and Casa Grande - where an unhooked launch is a physical impossibility. And he did absolutely nothing wrong.
...who queried the first pilot...
Randy.
...to see if he was ready to launch.
Yep. Hooked in and got his hang check at least ten minutes ago. Can't get much more ready to launch than that.
The response was that he was contemplating his launch as the conditions in the LZ were reported to be turbulent at times.
That's one problem Kunio won't have to deal with.
The accident pilot then decided to move to a different launch that had recently been constructed.
Uh-oh... The different launch that had recently been constructed doesn't have a:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/woodbits/3960696963/
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I have a bad feeling about this one.

Another shot of the plaque:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mingus_Mountain
Mingus Mountain - Wikipedia
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Note the name engraved in the concrete slab.

By the way... Here's Greg Porter:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3UbztgTtsc


launching off that same south ramp sans leg loops and secure chest five years minus four weeks after Kunio.

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Usually isn't but can be just as deadly as an unhooked launch. Maybe we need a supplemental or revised plaque at the back end of that ramp.

On the Google Earth imagery - 2017/06/11 - of the Mingus launch area you can clearly see that elegantly done plaque still in place at the back of the original launch.

http://live.staticflickr.com/65535/51115478386_1e1766290f_o.png
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34°42'09.87" N 112°06'57.33" W - 08342 feet

On the launch from which they had this fatal horror show witnessed by everyone including kids and dogs, the paraglider launch modified to accommodate hang gliders - zilch. (It's gonna remain zilch too. If somebody plants a plaque postmortem they're advertising that they think that's all it might've taken.)
Primarily intended for paraglider launches, it had been successfully flown by hang gliders...
Do tell us about all the times it's been unsuccessfully flown by hang gliders. Name some PG launches that are problematic for hang gliders.
...in fact, it had been created with a section expressly designed to accommodate hang glider launches.
Two sections to accommodate one hang glider - to the left and right of center.

Do tell us how one creates a PG launch with a section expressly designed to accommodate hang glider launch. Hangs need more width than paras, paras need clear ground behind them for inflation and can't have tree canopy encroachment overhead. From the bird's eye shot it looks like they're doing it backwards.
While the nose wires...
WHOSE nose wires? Randy's or Kunio's?
...were being held by the first pilot...
The first pilot to whom you refer as "the first pilot" pilot is Randy. Is Randy hooked in on the ramp holding his own nose wires? And, if so, why the fuck do we need to know that?
...the accident pilot...
Kunio.
...moved into position at the second launch.
I guess it would help clarify things too much if you referred to it as the north launch.
Another experienced hang glider pilot as well as a paraglider pilot also joined the launch crew.
So now we have three individuals on Kunio's crew. "The first pilot" is not the pilot first referred to as "the first pilot". This time the first pilot is the one introduced as:
...along with one other pilot, quickly set up his glider.
But obviously the intent of this anonymously authored pile o' crap of a document is to sow as many seeds of obfuscation and misdirection as possible.
After waiting for several minutes, a launch-cycle was called by the nose person.
The second pilot referred to as "the first pilot".
The accident pilot then launched, un-hooked, into the cycle.
What happened with respect to the SOP that reads:
With each flight, demonstrates a method of establishing that the pilot is hooked in just prior to launch.
Surely if that had been omitted you'd have commented on it just prior to getting to this point.
Emergency 911 was called.
1. Boy, that was quick thinking.
2. Bullshit. 911 wasn't called until after Kunio and his glider had ceased being airborne.
The accident pilot was observed immediately trying to climb into the control frame. He managed to get one knee over the bar, but the glider began to gyrate...
Do you know what GYRATE means? It's not a synonym for "OSCILLATE".
...and dive...
Gyrating and diving. Not a good situation.
...causing him to fall off the base tube.
Tell me how diving can cause one to fall off a basetube.
Repeated attempts to climb into the control frame proved impossible, as the glider continued to gyrate violently.
And here I was thinking we'd already fallen off the basetube.
The pilot was soon observed falling from the glider at the same time the parachute was thrown.
1. Which really doesn't make any sense. (Big surprise.) "Falling from the glider" isn't a fixed point in time.

2. Bullshit. The first statement we have is "Yoshimura threw his parachute and let go of the glider..." which can be interpreted as either he first threw his chute and then let go of the glider or the two actions were simultaneous. From the official eyewitness we have him so far down the slope that it can't be told exactly what the sequence was. THAT'S believable.
The glider's altitude at this time was estimated to be 75 to 100 ft. above the ground. The parachute only opened partially before the accident pilot impacted the mountainside.
Gee, if we just used ballistic chutes we'd be able to skip hook-in checks much more safely.
Several pilots on the scene rushed to the crash site...
Pity none of them had bothered to rush to the launch site a minute and a half earlier. But twenty minutes ago they'd told Kunio (and Randy) to "slow down" - which was way above and beyond the call of duty.
...arriving within half-an-hour, and attempted CPR.
We should really get more of our pilots trained and current on CPR. Think of all the lives we could save.
But the pilot was most likely killed on impact.
Ya think?
Emergency personnel were able to reach the pilot after approximately another hour...
Right. They'd called 911 while Kunio was still airborne, they had a chopper up over the slope, but it took emergency response an extra hour beyond what glider people from launch and the Tenth Street LZ were able to do. Bullshit.
...whereupon he was declared deceased.
Always nice...
"Merrill I am afraid to ask" "he shook his head.
...to have a second opinion.

From what witnesses were able to observe from launch there was reasonable hope that Kunio was just injured - and not too badly. But the first responders don't get there until an hour later than the glider people do to stroll up and see whether or not he's really dead?
AIRFRAME: A detailed damage description was not available. All damage to the glider was consistent with ground impact.
Why do we fuckin' care? What possible relevance could anything to do with the airframe have? Well... Maybe we could find something to explain the gyrations.
The hang-strap was intact...
Thanks. We were thinking the webbing might've blown apart two seconds after launch.
...and the carabiner was still clipped to the harness under the pilot's arm.
Exactly the way Bill Priday's was when they recovered his body - a wee bit shy of three years minus a month earlier. I'll bet he was using one of those black colored carabiners that did not stand out against his dark colored harness and could have easily been overlooked. Probably also a black extension strap of his glider's main that was long enough and of the proper color to make it appear, upon a cursory inspection, that the pilot was actually attached to his wing. Déjà vu all over again, huh Joe.
PARACHUTE: The accident pilot was using a Quantum 330 reserve parachute at the time of the accident.
At the time of the accident? He had a small stable of different parachutes but for this particular outing he decided on the Quantum 330?
The type, style, and size of reserve used were not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident.
Yeah motherfuckers? If he'd been flying a ballistic the outcome would've been virtually certainly the same? With just the hand deployed there was enough of an inflation to give the guys back at launch a realistic hope for a good outcome. I'm not a huge fan of ballistic chutes - 'specially as compensators for omitted hook-in checks - but don't tell me that if we had a time machine...
HELMET: The accident pilot was using a full-face hang-glider-style helmet at the time of the accident. The type and style of helmet used was not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident.
Sure seem to be thoroughly covering all the bases in terms of what was not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident. Also in not mentioning the only reliable defense we have in preventing unhooked launches.
The helmet (Icaro)...
You've already told us what kind of helmet it was - and we give a rat's ass even less at this point.
...was intact for the most part. The chin guard failed as designed in a full frontal impact.
1. When that happens with a Standard Aerotow Weak Link we count it as a success.
2. What? You're not gonna say anything about how this issue was not considered to be a factor in the survivability of the pilot in this accident?
3. We can probably slap another chin guard on it and find someone in need of an upgrade.
4. Sounds like a really good helmet to use for unhooked launches. How much they go for?
5. Designed to fail... Reminds me a lot of the full and complete hang check.
6. Yeah, tell us all about his helmet damage but nothing about his injuries. (Not that the matter in the least either.)
ANALYSIS: No electronically recorded flight information (GPS or barograph) was available for analysis of this accident.
SHIT!!! Now we'll probably never fully understand why this one went down the way it did.
There was no physical evidence indicating any failure of the glider or harness during or after the launch.
What an incredibly thorough job you're doing on this one. I'll bet you're at least doubling the interval to the next fatal.
An examination of the pilot's flight deck revealed that the pilot, apparently in his haste to pack up and fly again, failed to switch the instrument off after his earlier landing on the day of the accident.
When the focal point of Zack Marzec's safe towing system dumps him into a fatal inconvenience whipstall and tumble 150 feet off the runway we're not permitted to speculate about what went wrong. But it's perfectly OK for you to pull "...apparently in his haste to pack up and fly again..." outta your ass to paint this one the way u$hPa wants it.
The barograph feature of his instrument (FlyTec 4030 Race) was not turned on.
1. What a loser. Amazing this bozo managed to last as long as he did. Gotta give him some credit though for hoodwinking his instructors and ratings officials so successfully.

2. Who gives a flying fuck?
1977/08/19 - Dick Stark - 50 - Wills Wing SST 100 B - Fraley Mountain - Washington

Stark hooked in, then unhooked to adjust an instrument, forgot to hook in again. Stark apparently hung on all the way to impact several minutes later.
1988/09/04 - Eric Oppie - 32 - Novice - Delta Wing Dream - head, face, neck - Barr Mountain - Washington

Pilot failed to hook in and fell 200 feet. Was distracted with radio adjustment, neglected to do hang check, and launched without being hooked in.
Doug Hildreth - 1991/03

Failure to hook in has been around as long as the sport. Oddly enough, the incidence remains the same: five to ten reported cases per year. Fortunately, most are non-fatal. The primary cause is almost always pilot distraction. Typically the pilot is hooked in ready to go, unhooks to adjust his radio or camera, or goes to the car for something, or assists another pilot, etc., and returns to launch without hooking back in.
Doug Hildreth - 1991/04

Werner Graf, a Long Beach, California pilot was vacationing in Switzerland in October 1990. He prepared to launch, but unhooked to adjust his camera. He then proceeded to launch without hooking back in.
Chances are that he'd have launched even more unhooked if he'd been fucking around with electronic gadgets. And I'd be willing to wager that fucking around with...
1978/08/02 - Tim Schwarzenberg - 26 - Highster - Desert Mountain- Kalispell, Montana

Forgot his helmet, unhooked to get it. Launched without hooking up again. Hung onto control bar for several minutes, fell 400 feet. Body found four days later. Had told his roommate shortly before that he dreamed he, "fell out of my kite."
Luen Miller - 1994/09

The second pilot was distracted by backing off launch to get his helmet, which he had forgotten. While doing so he thought of a pilot who launched unhooked at Lookout Mountain as a result of the distraction of retrieving his helmet. Our pilot then proceeded to launch unhooked.
...helmets...

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...has precipitated more carnage than has been prevented by wearing them. (And no, you don't get to talk about crashes that wouldn't have been crashes if you'd been landing on reasonable wheels or skids.)

Kunio's helmet was buckled - you'd have had a field day with the issue otherwise. Ditto for Bill Priday.
Joe Gregor - 2006/01

SUMMARY REPORT:
2005/10/01 / approximately 14:00
Whitwell, Tennessee
52-year-old male, H-3
Wills Wing Sport 2
High Energy Tracer
Charlie Insider
SSE at 5-7 mph; nearly straight in and smooth

Synopsis: The accident pilot - who was reportedly eager to get into the air - carried his glider to the launch point and set it down tail to the wind. He walked out to launch to look at conditions and was told they were fine. ... The accident pilot checked his harness points (parachute handle, leg straps, hook knife, etc.) assiduously. ... The wire crewman on the right side reported that, after subsequently setting the glider down, the accident pilot started adjusting his VG rope and talking to the crew about how to give him feedback.
I'd say that there's a pretty good case to be made that the guy MORE likely to miss chickenshit issues like helmet buckles and vario settings is LESS likely to screw up on the stuff that actually matters. But talking about the chickenshit issues always helps draw attention to the failings of the dead guy and away from u$hPa and the dead guy's instructors and ratings officials.
Eyewitness statements all agree that the pilot initiated his launch while un-hooked from the glider.
1. And that all the local bears were definitely shitting in the woods.

2. Still in a big rush, right Joe? Didn't leave himself enough time to execute a full and complete hang check - or even allow the glider to float up five inches.

3. My, what incredibly observant eyewitnesses we have. There was virtually nothing of significance that any of them missed on this one.
As the glider lifted...
He's already launched at this point right?
...the accident pilot attempted to hold on and climb into the control frame.
No shit! As soon as the glider lifted Kunio knew he wasn't hooked in. Didn't even hafta do a full and complete hang check to make that determination and respond as best ho could at that point.
The extreme nosedown input this introduced would have caused the glider to fly very fast.
1. Not to mention gyrate. We see a lot of that when gliders are being flown very fast.

2. Thanks for clarifying that issue for us muppets. Otherwise we might not understand how our wing would respond to extreme nosedown input.
Additionally, it would have been difficult-to-impossible to maintain stable roll-control under these conditions.
A gyration is stable. That's why we use GYROscopes to stabilize equipment and instruments.
As a result, the glider became unstable in flight.
Stabilized pretty good right after flight though, didn't it?

The glider didn't become unstable - asshole. It was responding just fine to the input it was receiving. The problem was that the flight couldn't be safely controlled by someone trying to climb up into the control frame with his carabiner clipped back into his harness.
It is likely that the accident pilot recognized too late that the situation was quickly getting out of control...
Yeah, for the first ten seconds most of these unhooked launchers fail to realize the seriousness of their situations. It's a complacency issue. I propose we hold unhooked launch clinics to make sure pilots fully understand that one of these is no laughing matter and every second counts.
...and attempted to throw his parachute as he let go of the glider.
Oh, if only he'd thrown it immediately he'd have probably been OK. How long do you think it will take to start getting these clinics rolling?
Given his low altitude, the parachute did not have time to fully deploy before impact with the ground.
Yeah, they knew that as they were watching in horror from back at launch. Great stuff, Joe! No more than ten percent of your readers are still awake enough to do any damage at this point.
PROBABLE CAUSE: Failure to hook-in prior to launch.
1. Also just after launch. Let's keep people thinking about all possible options.
2. Or maybe the butler. We can't tell for sure 'cause all we have available are probable scenarios.
Failure to accomplish a successful hang-check just prior to launching.
1. A SUCCESSFUL HANG-CHECK JUST PRIOR TO LAUNCHING? What happened to a full and complete hang check? Did they change the SOPs while I was napping?

2. Tell us what an UNsuccessful hang check is.

- You have four inches of bar clearance but you only have a partial?

- You find yourself lying on your control bar 'cause you were too stupid to check to see if you were hooked in before you called for someone to grab your nose? Wouldn't that be an extremely successful hang check 'cause it just saved your life?

Has that scenario EVER actually happened?

Here's Garck doing a successful hang check:

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Suspension's fully loaded, weight's fully supported, bar clearance is optimal.

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Could've easily ended up a lot more dead than Kunio did. If Garck had done that hang check at staging or launch and the velcro had let loose as it did in the air a little over half a second later THAT would've been one of the most successful hang checks in world hang gliding history.
DISCUSSION:
Hey motherfucker... If you want an actual DISCUSSION then do it online. Also on Kite Strings where you won't have CHGA, u$hPa, Davis, Jack, Bob, Tom Galvin, Rob McKenzie, Greblo protecting you. And how 'bout you tell us what qualifies you to have this little discussion with yourself in a venue which will permit input and/or response from nobody else.
This particular hook-in failure is disturbing due to the fact that there were several people observing, including experienced hang glider pilots who were in attendance on his wing.
1. Whoa! Exactly the way the particular Bill Priday hook-in failure was disturbing! What were the odds?

2. So how come nowhere in this waste of space of a document do we have a punctuation mark's worth of perspective from any of them? If they're experienced pilots watching a Four prepping to launch with three feet of air between the bottom of his hang strap and carabiner and doing nothing to intervene isn't that pretty indicative of a failure of the entire u$hPa Pilot Proficiency System?

http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=25321
Stop the Stupids at the USHPA BOD meeting
Mark G. Forbes - 2011/09/29 02:26:23 UTC

We can establish rules which we think will improve pilot safety, but our attorney is right. USHPA is not in the business of keeping pilots "safe" and it can't be. Stepping into that morass is a recipe for extinction of our association. I wish it were not so, but it is. We don't sell equipment, we don't offer instruction, and we don't assure pilots that they'll be safe. Even so, we get sued periodically by people who say we "shoulda, coulda, woulda" done something that would have averted their accident.

It's not just concern for meet directors and policy makers...it's about our continued existence as an association. It's about minimizing the chance of our getting sued out of existence. We're one lawsuit away from that, all the time, and we think hard about it. I would LOVE to not have to think that way, but every time a legal threat arises, it reminds me that we have a very dysfunctional legal system in this country (note: not a "justice" system...there's little justice involved) and we have to recognize that reality and deal with it.
I'll take that as a yes. So what's the point in even reporting that this one happened? To present a façade of giving a flying fuck and increasing the interval to the next one?
As with all serious accidents...
...but virtually never in non serious accidents...
...an unbroken chain of unfortunate events were...
WAS.
...required to enable this tragic outcome...
...starting with commercial hang gliding's refusal to implement the hook-in check requirement/SOP the better part of three decades ago at this point. But keep on pretending it doesn't exist. And have fun living with yourself knowing that if you weren't instrumental in pulling off the Bill Priday cover-up there'd have been a fair chance this one wouldn't have happened.
...including:
Oh, we'd be so much more interested in hearing the issues you're EXcluding.
a) The accident pilot was excited from his prior successful flight and was rushing to get back into the air.
Oh, the Hang Four accident pilot was excited from successfully pulling off a late morning sled and was champing at the bit for another one. (Note to self... Avoid getting excited about the prospects for the next flight at all costs.)

He's a goddam Four, Joe. Yeah, things were looking good and we like to capitalize... But nobody's that goddam giddy to get off the ramp for ANYTHING.
b) The traditional hang gliding launch was not utilized.
Yeah, there's no fuckin' way something like this would've happened at a well established hang gliding launch like Torrey, McConnellsburg, Coronet Peak, Whitwell, Woodside, Kagel, Interlaken...
A ritual...
A ritual... Really hard to beat rituals for making sure things are done right in aviation.
...is more or less followed...
'Specially rituals that are more or less followed. A full and complete hang check comes to mind.

I don't do rituals, Joe. I do PROCEDURES to effect the results I want to achieve. My vario goes onto my starboard downtube right after my control frame is set up and before the cover comes off my folded wings 'cause that helps minimize the time my sail's exposed to UV and I'm vulnerable to gusts and dust devils. I do stomp tests 'cause I'd rather find out if there's a structural integrity issue with my glider on the ground than twenty seconds after launch. I do hook-in checks within a couple seconds of launch so I don't need to try to remember whether or not I hooked myself in and caught my leg loops five minutes ago and 'cause the cost in time and effort is either too close to zero to be worthy description or actually zero.

When people are more or less thinking about following rituals they're not thinking about what needs to be done and why. Save your rituals for church.
...when using this launch that facilitates a hangcheck...
Any launch that facilitates a hang check also facilitates a failure to hook in incident.
...since the launching pilot must climb up to launch, making his or her hang strap/straps readily visible to someone in front of him.
Here's the approach to the south launch:

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illustrating the huge climb to launch position on the ramp. That approach affords a better shot of the suspension to the guy BEHIND him.

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There's LESS chance that the view will be obstructed by wing and ZERO chance that the view will be obstructed by body, head, helmet. Not to mention the fact that Kunio's suspension was routed around his side and clipped to some webbing under his arm.

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White guy can't see the connection worth shit from the earlier / better assistance position.
c) Those pilots observing the launch assumed that the accident pilot was hooked-in.
1. And thus would have absolutely no need to execute a hook-in check in accordance with u$hPa's seventeen plus year old SOP.
2. Why not? What's the statistical likelihood that he wouldn't be?
3. Those pilots OBSERVING the launch? How 'bout the crew PARTICIPATING IN the launch?
4. What would happen if instructors trained all student pilots to always assume the pilot ISN'T hooked in?
d) No hang-check was asked for, nor was one offered.
1. By those pilots observing the launch. So nobody was serving as crew. Thanks for clarifying that point.

2. And when the guy under the glider is that confident why should anybody else be concerned enough to look at his suspension?

3. The site protocol is for the pilot to get a hang check in the staging area. Why would anyone ask for or offer a hang check at launch position?

4. What kind of hang check, Joe? A full and complete one? That would be the only safe and reliable protocol for determining whether or not Kunio was hooked in at launch position?

5. Oh. So this folding car-toppable single seat recreational aircraft which weighs in at about a hundred pounds counting cockpit, parachute, instruments can only be safely preflighted with a minimum of two cooks - one saddled up and hopefully ready to go and another pulling down on his nose and ready with a second opinion.

If there were half a dozen gliders on a mountaintop with walls of flames coming up on all sides only five of them would be able to get away safely airborne. The last guy would do as best as he could under the circumstances but would still essentially be rolling dice. He'd start this run not knowing whether or not:
- he'd:
-- fully engaged the main and backup and had the carabiner locked
-- gotten both leg loops
- his:
-- clearance was the same as it had been for the previous twenty flights
-- helmet was safely buckled
-- parachute container was properly closed and safetied

I can only imagine the horror of being in a situation in which I'd be compelled to launch without being given a full and complete hang check.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
WHOSE recommendations? We read some crap with no name attached to it in the magazine of an organization which - as been openly and publicly stated - isn't and can't be in the safety business and we're supposed adhere to them? Nothing new since 2005/10/01 Bill Priday, same SOPs, same instructors... How could we possibly fail to get better results.
Always accomplish a good hang-check...
hangcheck / hang-check | hang strap / hang-strap | reassemble / re-assembly | cliff-launch | difficult-to-impossible | fact-of-the-matter | half-an-hour | hooked-in | failure to hook-in | unhooked / un-hooked | launch-cycle | pilot-in-command | preflight / pre-flight | roll-control | single-point failures | low-survivability
1. Fun with and without hyphens. (And you're the guy who's gonna tell all us stupid muppets how to consistently launch connected to our gliders using solid standard operating procedures.)

2. Just a GOOD hang check? Not a full and complete one? Our lives are totally depending on this one. Shouldn't we accomplish the best hang check currently known in this corner of the galaxy?
...JUST prior to launching.
1. It is physically IMPOSSIBLE to do a hang check JUST prior to launching. Also not SAFE in many circumstances which come to mind. (And we're always gonna have an assistant standing by, right Joe?)

2. Show me ONE video of someone accomplishing a good hang-check JUST prior to launching.

3. If we need help just to determine whether or not we're safely connected to our gliders how are you expecting us to safely fly in thermal traffic, gauge what we can safely cross in XC flights, identify safe landing options, set up solid approaches?
Make effective use of your wire crew to assist in the completion of all individual pre-flight checks.
1. And here I was thinking that Hang Ones were supposed to be able to complete all individual preflight checks on their own. I guess the issue of being connected to one's glider before initiating launch is just too daunting to be handled by anything south of a committee of Intermediate and Advanced rated launch crewmen. (By the way... How's that approach been working out the past few years?

2. Right. The guy who can't reliably get himself into position on the ramp ready to leave with his glider is gonna be totally great at organizing enough people to make sure he's good to go. (How large a committee are you recommending? Hang Four Kunio had three and that wasn't quite enough.)
DISCUSSION: The pilot-in-command of any aircraft bears full responsibility for the safe conduct of his or her flight.
1. Did you ask Randy Skywalker how he feels about that? (He seems to have drifted off the radar. I'm pretty sure hang gliding was never again a lot of fun for him after this one.)

2. What responsibility does the instructor who trained and certified the Pilot In Command have? Zero? If that's the case then how do we measure the competence of the instructor? And if we can't do that (and we can't) then what's the point of having a Pilot Proficiency System? Kunio had been rated a Four months earlier. If we'd just grabbed a wuffo at launch, hooked him in, thrown him off he wouldn't have ended up any more dead than Kunio did.

3. People are, to this day, required to be paid up u$hPa Three rated members to fly Mingus - despite it being public Prescott National Forest land. (If you believe AZHPA anyway.) People pay u$hPa certified instructors to be trained to competently and safely operate in these environments. And if there's a pattern of failures such as this one and it becomes obvious that u$hPa and its instructors and ratings officials are violating and disregarding clearly stated SOPs then bullshit.
Hang gliders are almost always broken down for storage and transport and flown immediately after re-assembly at the new launch site.
Not so much if it's an old launch site.
R.V. Wills - 1980/09

1979/06/07 - Joseph Oliver - Olympus 180 - Mingus Mountain - Cottonwood, Arizona

Pilot received his Hang 4 rating only two days prior. Had no witnesses for a 25 mile cross-country flight the day prior, so had a case of "go-for-it" (this time, with witnesses on hand). Normal launch in mellow 10-15 mph wind. Turned left to work marginal lift, flew out of the light thermal, stalled, dived in at 45 degrees only 200 feet from takeoff. Observer believes he flew too close to an unforgiving site (boulders), misjudged his airspeed in a thermal. Sadly, his nine year old son was one of the spectators.
(Seeing any patterns here, Joe?)
Such operations place an extreme premium on pre-flight checks to ensure that the aircraft is properly assembled and airworthy for flight.
1. Bullshit. They're pains to set up / break down what with all the battens but - with the notable exceptions of the hook-in and sidewire issues - it's pretty hard to fuck up anything that's gonna matter much. And both of those issues are very easily dealt with but the population at large refuses to implement the procedures.

2. Preflight checks are worse than useless for this issue. That was being recognized well prior to that earlier Mingus incident and was stated by Doug Hildreth in black and white two magazine issues subsequent to that one.
The common practice of donning the harness while waiting to launch and hooking in just prior to flight, ups the ante even more.
How much effort did you exert extracting that statement from your ass? It's flatly contradicted by the guy who was at launch position on the south ramp when Kunio went off.
Randy SkyWalker - 2008/09/03 00:14

I have been a monitor at Yosemite for years and if you try to walk out on that rock hooked in on my watch or with any other monitor you will find you wont get past the first step because of safety protocol.
NOBODY approaches launch at Glacier Point hooked in...

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...and nobody ever has or ever will launch from Glacier Point unhooked. Ditto for...

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Makapu'u. If Kunio had been operating in Glacier Point mode rather than Mingus mode this would've never happened.
By analogy, this would be like a general aviation pilot walking around the tarmac while wearing his/her cockpit as he prepares for flight, and hooks up the wings of his aircraft just prior to taking the runway.
Sure Joe...

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=13359
Today was a bad day!
Mike Bomstad - 2009/08/26 04:21:15 UTC

The harness is part of the aircraft... end of story.
(Just because it's easy to remove, does not mean it should be. Dont choose the path of least resistance)

Attach it to the wing, completing the aircraft.... then preflight the completed aircraft.
Buckle yourself into the cockpit and then your ready.
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Whatever you say.

There IS NO analogy to this one in conventional aviation. But there's a virtually perfect analogy in firearms safety. I submitted an article for publication in the magazine. But...
Nick Greece - 2009/10/13 16:03:35 UTC

Hi there,

Sorry it has taken me a bit to reply. Your ideas are being considered at the committee chair level. I sent your article to Joe Gregor, the safety chair, for comment and he will get back to you shortly.

Thanks and let me know if you have any questions!

Nick
I'm still waiting to hear back from the dickhead u$hPa has serving as its Safety Chair to see if it's up to his sterling standards.
Viewed in this way, the supreme importance of a pre-flight hang-check accomplished JUST PRIOR to flight is made clear.
And keep on expecting even better results.
Redundancy is a key safety principle when it comes to aviation.
Fuck yeah, Joe.

- Keep writing these bullshit fatality reports emphasizing the critical importance of the a full and complete hang check while continuing to say absolutely nothing about hook-in checks and the relevant u$hPa SOP...

http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=24846
Is this a joke ?
Davis Straub - 2011/08/28 15:26:28 UTC

Then again, Russell Brown had us double up behind him after six breaks in a row at Zapata. We couldn't figure out why we had so many breaks so quickly. Maybe just coincidence.
...and you're bound to get better results. And be sure to keep on working on getting that flare timing perfected.

- Which is why we have backup loops. And I'm pretty sure that if Kunio had had a backup loop for his backup loop - and maybe another wire crewman on his tail - somebody would've surely noticed that he wasn't hooked into any of them.

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1167
The way it outa be
Steve Kinsley - 2005/10/04 14:04:25 UTC

One last attempt.

We have now rounded up all the usual suspects and promised renewed vigilance, nine page checklists, hang checks every six feet, etc. Bob Gillisse redux.

A hang check is part of preflighting your equipment. You do it in the setup area - not on the launch or the ramp. When you get in line you are hooked in and ready to go. No going down for a hang check cum hook-in check.
He lives under half a mile north of you - motherfucker. Guess he sold his soul so he could get along, have flying buddies, continue his career.

- Redundancy puts people to sleep and THAT's what causes unhooked launches. It's only possible to do ONE hook-in check just prior to launch. I might have done fifteen hook-in checks over the course of the past minute and a half but those expire after two seconds. I do ONE just before I commit. Everything else was totally irrelevant fidgeting.
Single-point failures can be deadly.
Like when we just have one anonymous asshole in the national organization crafting the fatality reports, telling us that we need to keep doing the same things over and over again better, not permitting or responding to alternate approaches and critical feedback?
Critical safety-of-flight items like being hooked-in...
And like what else? How come there are - for all intents and purposes - ZERO other critical safety-of-flight items like being hooked in that result in serious manglings and fatalities which would've picked up by competent preflights?

The other shit that destroys people:
- Infallible Standard Aerotow Weak Links
- easily reachable Industry Standard bent pin releases
- tow drivers poised to fix whatever's going on back there by giving us the rope
- old Frisbees in the middles of landing fields to designate our spots
- perfectly timed landing flares
- pro toad bridles
- using:
-- downtubes as control bar extensions
-- feet as landing gear
you make standard operating procedure.
...should be checked multiple times (redundancy in time) and by more than one individual (redundancy in space).
Yep, the more redundancy you have in setup and preflight procedures the more secure you can feel when you're on the ramp waiting for a cycle. Then you can focus on important shit like getting a good hard run and not popping your nose.
Every pilot should build into his preflight checklist at least two checklist items verifying that he is properly clipped into the glider.
Let's make it six - three times less likely to launch unhooked. Throw in four or five signs and/or plaques on the approach to the ramp. That should be plenty enough.
Every pilot should utilize any wire crew available to assist in verifying that he is clipped into the glider properly.
Tell me why anyone too stupid to verify himself that he is clipped into the glider properly has any business launching in the first place. And while you're at it tell me why we should be listening to some anonymous asshole telling us to utilize crew to verify that we're safely connected.

The problem we have is with people who are 100.00 percent positive that they're totally good to go because they:
- believe they've done everything their idiot instructors have told them to
- have never had a problem before
The final check should be accomplished as soon as practicable prior to launching - to reduce the chances of compromising the configuration prior to flight.
Would a lift and tug at T minus two seconds do the trick? Or would that just give you a false sense of security and/or put your wing up into the turbulent jet stream?

Is it OK if we're doing the final check AS we're launching? If we have our wing lifting in the wind, tensioning our suspension, pulling our leg loops would that be good enough?
Launching unhooked at a cliff-launch, or any other site that does not involve a shallow grass-covered slope, is every hang glider pilot's worst nightmare.
1. Every pilot's worst nightmare is missing his spot by ten feet and beaking it with an imperfectly timed landing flare.

2. Bille Floyd was tow launching on a billiard table flat dry lakebed minus the nightmare - and the connection - and lost both legs as a consequence. And the deal would've been exactly the same with as much grass as you cared to add.

3. Oh, you went around and polled every pilot to find out what his worst nightmare was before submitting this report. Funny, I don't recall you contacting me.

4. If launching unhooked WERE actually his worst nightmare we wouldn't have any unhooked launches. When Kunio went off the Mingus north ramp his worst nightmare was having a wing go up and ground looping back into the slope. That's why he had guys on both wings and another on the nose coaching him on the cycles.

5. My worst nightmare on every foot launch - regardless of what I have in the way of slope, surface, conditions - is that I'm not safely hooked in. That way there's no chance of me forgetting to do an actual hook-in check. And I maintain that nightmare until well after the point at which I'd be able to do much about the problem. Same mindset when I'm observing somebody else's foot launch.
Given the control frame configuration of most higher performance hang gliders, the ability to fly safely while hanging from the basetube is severely compromised.
But if you have an older mid performance glider you'll be in much better shape. So you needn't sweat the issue too much.
A modern hand-thrown reserve system requires a significant amount of altitude (see manufacturer documentation) above the ground to fully deploy.
1. The older ones popped out a lot faster. They decided to slow them down 'cause with all that extra safety margin people were pushing envelopes a lot more and the sport was getting a bad name as a consequence.

2. Altitude ABOVE THE GROUND. Really. (Good thing this is only a SUMMARY.)
Speed through the air can significantly reduce this deployment time and the altitude required.
1. Right. So if you're at 150 feet dropping at eighty you'll be in much better shape than you would at forty. And if you're really heavy you'll thus have a significant advantage over the little scrawny guys.

2. As opposed to speed through the water.

3. If you'd said something about HORIZONTAL speed that sentence might have actually made some sense. But your inclusion of it in this report still WOULDN'T.

4. Thanks bigtime, Joe. I'll be sure to remember that after I've forgotten to hook in next time and am dangling from the control bar considering my options.
The fact-of-the-matter is that depending on the site being flown, launching unhooked is a very low-survivability event.
No shit? I'm afraid we muppets haven't been taking this issue anywhere near seriously enough. If only you could've gotten through to Kunio in time.
There is very little the pilot can do to survive the incident once the launch has been initiated.
OK then. Let's start being careful out there.
The best course of action is to ensure that the pilot is properly hooked-in prior to flight.
Can I hear some of those post unhooked launch options again? I'm still not fully convinced.

Your mission, should you decide to accept, is to write enough crap related to unhooked launches for us to be able to fill up parts of three magazine pages and create the illusion that we give a rat's ass about this guy's death. But, you know the drill, say absolutely nothing of any actual substance and call it a summary of a much more extensive report that we're maintaining in our confidential files available only to the small cadre of highly qualified individuals actually working on things.
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

Segue to Greg Porter's 2013/08/02 leg loopless and chest buckleless launch from the Mingus original/south launch five years minus four weeks post Kunio. Similar meteorological conditions, similar mistake with the potential for identical outcome.

I'd done a stills project from Greg's video 2016/08/20 13:39:11 UTC:
http://www.kitestrings.org/post9590.html#p9590
but after this extensive Kunio reworking decided that Greg's incident and video needed extensive reworking. Stills count went from 33 to 102. (The originals can be IDed using the URLs). Greg DOES produce really nice quality videos and the stills help a lot in understanding what was going on with the 2008/08/30 Kunio.

Yeah, fundamentally all that really mattered was that Kunio was never trained to and didn't do hook-in checks but it's nice to understand peripheral issues - and it's a really beautiful flying site.

http://www.kitestrings.org/post5349.html#p5349

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3UbztgTtsc
I Launched Without Buckling into my Harness - a hang gliding film by Greg Porter
Greg Porter - 2013/10/02

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3UbztgTtsc


The camera was running as I launched from Mingus in 2013 without being buckled into my harness. Rather than sweep this mistake under the rug, I wanted to put this video out in hopes that it may keep some other pilot from making the same mistake. As hard to believe as it may be, my harness was hooked to the glider, but I hadn't buckled myself into it... I was only zipped in at the chest. I had even done a hang check and thought I was good to go. I cover all that in the video in hopes that it may be helpful. Comments are closed due to spamming. Glad to get emails. Address is at the end of the video

More detail on the checklist system:
Dan Schroeder's system (a fellow AZ Mingus pilot) was based on the idea that if the Final Checklist was somehow ALWAYS dangling in front of you when you were hooked in just prior to launch, then you had less chance of forgetting to go through the Final Checklist just before launching. He had a small quick-disconnect (like you see on some car key rings) that was diaper-pinned to side of the main sail zipper fabric out near the nose of the glider. The lower half of the quick disconnect (which was obviously removable) trailed the same bright red streamer and plastic card that you see in my video. The hard plastic card has a hole cut in it right at the very edge of the card, with a slit cut between the hole and the edge of the card that allows the card to be bent and the hole to be opened temporarily. This slit allowed the card and wound-up red streamer (when detached from the quick-release) to be clipped (muscled) onto the harness carabiner, where it hung for the flight. When unhooking from the glider after the flight, the pilot is reminded of the card because it's right there on the carabiner. The pilot would right then remove it from the carabiner and re-attach it via the quick-disconnect to the other half of the quick-disconnect that was still diaper-pinned to the main zipper. Then, with the card once again dangling near the nose with its bright red streamer, the card is folded up with the glider and is once again dangling for the next flight. A great system I think, because the card is "always" dangling right in front of your face when you are hooked in to the glider prior to launch. If the pilot doesn't notice it (tough not too!) then launch assistants probably would, thus reminding the pilot to go through the final checklist.

I changed the setup a bit and prefer the card to be permanently tied with a simple knot to an existing brass-grommeted hole in the sail under the nose cone because
1) It's never detached during the flight process so I can't lose it,
2) When stowed under the nose cone it doesn't compromise the aerodynamics of the glider by flapping around on the carabiner
3) It's still dangling in front of me before every flight, without fail
4) I can easily reach it, review it, and stow it while fully hooked in and prepared to launch.
5) I velcro my nosecone on during preflight when I temporarily have full VG. With this system I don't have to un-velcro the nose cone in order to stow the card, since the card has its own velcro and simply slides under the nosecone and sticks to the velcro I place on the back side of the nose cone..

NOTE: If, once you have reviewed the final checklist and stowed it under the nosecone, you decide to unhook from the glider for any reason, you need to be sure and pull the card from under the nose cone and let it dangle once again. Dan disagrees with my revision to the system because he feels that during this scenario, if the card was hooked to the carabiner instead of stowed under the nose cone, the pilot would see it there when temporarily unhooking and would move it from the carabiner to the hanging position, so that when the pilot returned to re-hook in the card would be dangling. He feels there is a very high rate of unhooked launches due to being hooked in and then unhooking temporarily and then forgetting to re-hook in when launching. This is a good point and something you should consider when deciding whether to attach the final checklist to the nose of the glider or to the carabiner.

Oh, before I forget, 2 important things about the contents of the 2 checklists:
1) Ensure that the first item on the Final Checklist card is "Pre-Flight Checklist Completed" or something like that.
2) Ensure that one of the items on the Pre-Flight Checklist is "Final Checklist Card is Dangling from the Glider" or something like that.

In summary, having the checklist anywhere that works for the pilot is much better than no checklist at all.... the idea is to find a method that ensures the pilot is reminded to use the card on every flight. Dan feels strongly that he has investigated all the options over many years and the carabiner clip method is the most fool proof.

I gave all the detail above because I want everyone to know the thought process behind this checklist system, so they could consider those points as they decide what works best for them.
Jack Show discussion:
http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=30048
I launched with my harness UNBUCKLED
Greg Porter - 2013/10/03 03:11:48 UTC

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]Hey...

So this video's primarily for hang glider pilots. I made a mistake during a launch and I wanna share it with you in hopes that you won't make the same.

What I did was I launched with my harness hooked to the glider, but I was not buckled into the harness.

I'll show you the launch, I'll show you the terrible landing that I had as a result... I was very fortunate that it didn't turn out much worse.
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I think what the problem was, was I had a false sense of security. I felt like if I hooked my harness into the glider without fail, before I ever got into the harness, that I'd never launch unhooked. And so that's what I did on this launch as I always did. So when I started to buckle myself in, that's where my process fell down. I was preoccupied with things that had happened during preflight, and so I didn't think through the steps. And I didn't buckle myself into the harness.

I even did a hang check. And I didn't catch it in the hang check. So I'll show you how that happened.
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This is the correct configuration the harness should be in when I go to launch...
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I have my leg loops around me...
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...I have my leg loop buckle is secured...
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Under this zipper I have...
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...a chest buckle that's secured...
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And then...
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I'm zipped down.

Now when I went to launch I had forgotten to do...
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...my leg loops and...
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...I had forgotten to do my chest buckle.
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So all I did was I attached this zipper... 'cause I was preoccupied...
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...and I zipped it down...
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...and I felt secure - totally secure. When I went to launch...
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...all of a sudden my weight - of course the harness is hooked...
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...to the glider - my weight fell...
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...to my armpits here... and when that happened, this zipper...
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...opened up to there...
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...after launch.
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I did a...
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...hang check...
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...in this configuration... And so I thought I was OK.

Lemme show you that hang check.
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So... There was the hang check. And I know now that it felt OK to me because my zipper was done which supported my chest weight and when I push with my feet against the boot of the harness it raised my hips off the ground. And so I couldn't tell that my leg loops were unattached.

A lot of pilots will...
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...pick up the glider, until they feel the tension on their leg loops, to be sure those leg loops are attached.

I'll show you...
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...after the video of the flight what I'm doing different to make sure this doesn't happen. But for now let's go take a look at the flight. It was pretty scary. Here you go.
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My wife looks on as I start my run
Not showing my wire man, a good friend and an excellent pilot - this was 100% my issue.
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For a second I thought I should kneel on the base tube, but then decided I should stand in the boot.
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I feel the zipper has moved up, but maintaining glider control is #1
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Now trying for the lower zipper, but this is Mingus... pretty turbulent.
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I am worried the zippers will split
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With no leg loops I'll have to land zipped up...
Have a decision to make:
I now need to land in the BIG LZ... and I am too low to reach it. Do I go back and hope for a thermal? What would you do?
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I notice the sun warming that low ridge...
Yes !!
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How high to go? I fear my zipper could split at any time. Decisions, decisions...
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High enough! Even if I hit major sink on the way out...
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My full weight in the boot has torn the harness internally, so I can't make it go prone...
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I don't want to anyway... My proned weight would stress the zipper more...
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<-- 10th St LZ
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<- Launch
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I find that I cannot finely control the glider from this weird position...
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x
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Hey that was scary, huh? So ya know I heard that the definition of insanity is continue to do the same thing and to expect different results. So I decided to make a change. And so now I've incorporated a formal checklist system when I fly.

There's a lot of them out there. This is the one I'm using, I wanna thank Dan Schroeder for it - one of our local hang glider pilots here in Arizona.
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So it's a two checklist system, here's a preflight checklist - and I'll give you a copy of both of these at the end of the video, just for your reference...

So once I'm done with preflighting and I get in my harness then this is the FINAL checklist, the one I go through just before I walk up on the ramp to launch.
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I can reach it while I'm hooked in
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And I read through this checklist, make sure I'm good to go, I roll it up, I slide it up here in the nosecone... It has a piece of velcro on it, and there's also a velcro on the backside of the nose cone, and there's a catch there, I'm aerodynamic, and it's secure...
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Once I'm done flying and I go to break down... Peel the nose cone off... And this checklist is permanently attached to the glider so it's there for the next flight.

I hope you found the video to be helpful... I think for me the main point is don't assume that just because your harness is hooked into the glider that you are properly buckled into the harness. You saw my hang check. And it looked like I was good to go.

So I hope that you have safe flying... I will see you again, maybe on the next mistake that I make. Until then... fly safe, see ya soon. See ya.
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Don't let this, or worse, happen to you...
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

A few scene-of-the-crimes shots...

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Launches face ESE. The tall tower close to the drop-off is about 107 yards to the left of the south launch ramp. The north launch is about 60 yards to the right - it'll be at the little dip of the horizon.

Launch is 7825 feet, Tenth Street LZ is 3303, vertical is 4522. It's a BEAUTIFUL site but to me it makes a lot more sense to launch behind a Dragonfly at the Cottonwood Airport and pin off at 2K. And if they'd been operating that way Kunio would still be around and if Greg had launched and landed zipped then his unbuckled chest strap and leg loops wouldn't have mattered.

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End of the launch face escarpment - 34°42'27.10" N 112°06'40.92" W

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The Verde River is flowing south along / defining the far edge of Cottonwood. Dumps into the Salt which flows through Phoenix and dumps into the Gila which dumps into the Colorado at Yuma.

Note the creek which drains the slope below us and flows away from us down to the Verde.

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Blowout Creek - drains off the area at the end of the escarpment, defines the NNW end of the Cottonwood runway and the upstream / WNW end of the Tenth Street LZ. Also, at the bottom edge of the above frame there's a little patch of clear ground to the left of the creek (and off the near end of the big light colored oval) - 34°43'18.12" N 112°03'19.80" W. That's the current Mingus LZ.

Silver Spring Gulch defines the SSE end of the Airport runway.

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Closer look at the Tenth Street LZ.

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Launch (according to Greg's captioning) is on the horizon a wee bit to the left of the cloud shadows. (Note the paths of Silver Spring Gulch and Blowout Creek.)

Greg seems to have faded out of the sport not long after this 2013/08/02 incident. Last Jack Show post and presence (gpwrinkled) - 2015/02/23 15:32:00 UTC and 2015/08/13 20:51:52 UTC respectively.
User avatar
Tad Eareckson
Posts: 9161
Joined: 2010/11/25 03:48:55 UTC

Re: You are NEVER hooked in.

Post by Tad Eareckson »

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3UbztgTtsc
I Launched Without Buckling into my Harness - a hang gliding film by Greg Porter
Greg Porter - 2013/10/02

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B3UbztgTtsc


The camera was running as I launched from Mingus in 2013 without being buckled into my harness. Rather than sweep this mistake under the rug...
Speaking of sweeping stuff under the rug... Any of you Arizona guys know who signed Kunio off on any of his ratings?
I wanted to put this video out in hopes that it may keep some other pilot from making the same mistake. As hard to believe as it may be, my harness was hooked to the glider, but I hadn't buckled myself into it... I was only zipped in at the chest.
Hard to believe?
Doug Hildreth - 1992/01

1991/09/19 - Mark Kerns - Advanced - 41 - Airwave Magic IV - Wasatch Mountain State Park, Utah - Fatal: head, chest, pelvis, leg

Experienced pilot simply forgot to put legs through leg straps of cocoon harness. He could not get his foot into the boot after launch (which has saved other pilots), was able to hold on for several seconds, but slipped out of the harness and fell 200 feet. Died instantly.
Right about four hundred miles a tiny bit east of straight north from the Mingus ramp. How quickly they forget. And...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-_oF-BSqnEs
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2007 - Florida Ridge.

Also note that that extremely Two-looking guy gets that glider safely and smoothly stopped...

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...with no perfectly timed landing flare and negligible reliance on wheels. Compare...

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...Contrast...

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(Great job on the spot though. I don't think Florida Ridge Guy made the slightest effort to hit the designated spot.)
I had even done a hang check and thought I was good to go.
You had EVEN done a HANG CHECK and that failed to detect the leg loops and chest buckles? Was it a full and complete hang check? What's the point of Joe writing up and publishing those FTHI fatality reports (the most recent one from Mingus) if nobody's gonna pay the least attention to them and his excellent recommendations?
I cover all that in the video in hopes that it may be helpful.
How much effort did you put into researching the issue, seeing what others before you had to say before solving all our connection issues for us?
Comments are closed due to spamming.
And The Jack Show is closed to all individuals in whom Jack senses a potential for getting issues properly addressed.
Glad to get emails. Address is at the end of the video
And it's customary to have periods at the end of sentences
More detail on the checklist system:
Dan Schroeder's system (a fellow AZ Mingus pilot) was based on the idea that if the Final Checklist was somehow ALWAYS dangling in front of you when you were hooked in just prior to launch, then you had less chance of forgetting to go through the Final Checklist just before launching.
My system is to assume I'm NOT hooked in and in my leg loops just prior to launch, think about the possible ensuing consequences. And, even if I did nothing else, that would cause me to really think about whether or not I had distinct memories of fully hooking in, doing a chest buckle, engaging/securing leg loops. There are ZERO records of individuals having doubts about any of these critical connection issues launching with them. And the vast majority of these incidents are survived minus serious consequences. (This video of yours is a prime example.)

And save your "less chance" bullshit for poker and Russian roulette. Connection status on the ramp can be and often is a life-or-death issue. The previous reported Mingus launch issue was totally and swiftly fatal. If "less chance" is the best we think we can do then we shouldn't be playing this game.
He had a small quick-disconnect (like you see on some car key rings) that was diaper-pinned to side of the main sail zipper fabric out near the nose of the glider.
Well, looks like we've decided this is the best way to address connection issues so let's waste no time getting to the details of construction.

By the way... Has Dan ever reported any significant SAVE attributable to his system? No. Systems like these never actually do anything. But the guys who develop and use these systems never launch un- or insecurely hooked 'cause they're the ones most afraid / smart enough to know they're capable of doing it. After your 2013/08/02 incident you got a lot more scared and a wee bit smarter. That was enough. Also... I don't think you had more than a dozen flights left in your career after that.
The lower half of the quick disconnect (which was obviously removable) trailed the same bright red streamer and plastic card that you see in my video.
Any thoughts on the reasons this plaque:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/woodbits/3960696963/
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which you walked over....

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...while NOT being securely hooked in had no effect on you? I have a few.

Due to the physical layout of the setup/approach/launch area damn near a hundred percent of flyers are already hooked in as they move over the plaque and into launch position. It's physically impossible to follow the instructions without first unhooking. Ever see anyone do that?

If I were gonna do a plaque on approach to launch it would look like:

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No instructions, just the image. I have that image in my head every time I launch off a ramp but I'm one in a thousand. Randy, you AZHGA assholes have "HOOK IN NOW!", "WELCOME TO MINGUS MNT.", a couple high performance gliders thermalling around just fine. My sign's gonna say, "Listen up, motherfucker... 45 seconds from now you might be dangling from your basetube thinking about your options."
The hard plastic card has a hole cut in it right at the very edge of the card, with a slit cut between the hole and the edge of the card that allows the card to be bent and the hole to be opened temporarily. This slit allowed the card and wound-up red streamer (when detached from the quick-release) to be clipped (muscled) onto the harness carabiner, where it hung for the flight. When unhooking from the glider after the flight, the pilot is reminded of the card because it's right there on the carabiner. The pilot would right then remove it from the carabiner and re-attach it via the quick-disconnect to the other half of the quick-disconnect that was still diaper-pinned to the main zipper. Then, with the card once again dangling near the nose with its bright red streamer, the card is folded up with the glider and is once again dangling for the next flight. A great system I think, because the card is "always" dangling right in front of your face when you are hooked in to the glider prior to launch. If the pilot doesn't notice it (tough not too!) then launch assistants probably would, thus reminding the pilot to go through the final checklist.
I don't need to go through the final checklist bullshit, Greg. I did that back in the setup area ten minutes ago. What I need to do on the ramp is get my crew to help me position and trim my glider for launch and verify my connection and leg loops two seconds before committing. And I don't need to read anything on a card to help keep me on those tasks. And if I did I shouldn't launch anyway 'cause on approach and landing I'll be doing a lot more complex and demanding tasks in situations that don't allow me to hit the pause button to see what's next on the card.

Tell ya sumpin' else... The guy who does that for himself is also the guy who, while serving on crew, is gonna make sure Bill Priday and Kunio Yoshimura go off safely connected. You're more likely to be looking to see whether or not the guy has adopted your checklist card configuration.
I changed the setup a bit...
Dude! That makes you a TEST PILOT. (And I don't like test pilots.)
...and prefer the card to be permanently tied with a simple knot to an existing brass-grommeted hole in the sail under the nose cone because
1) It's never detached during the flight process so I can't lose it,
2) When stowed under the nose cone it doesn't compromise the aerodynamics of the glider by flapping around on the carabiner
The way untold tens of thousands of stupid backup loops do all the fuckin' time?
3) It's still dangling in front of me before every flight, without fail
Like the end of the launch ramp is at every flight's beginning?
4) I can easily reach it, review it, and stow it while fully hooked in and prepared to launch.
What is it that you'd need to review on a card hooked in at launch position? My vario might not be on with the altimeter properly adjusted. I can take five seconds and go through a mental checklist which will include chickenshit issues like that and whether or not my helmet's buckled.
5) I velcro my nosecone on during preflight when I temporarily have full VG. With this system I don't have to un-velcro the nose cone in order to stow the card, since the card has its own velcro and simply slides under the nosecone and sticks to the velcro I place on the back side of the nose cone..
Tell us about some of the issues you've caught fucking around with your checklist that are more problematic than fucking around with your checklist.
NOTE: If, once you have reviewed the final checklist and stowed it under the nosecone, you decide to unhook from the glider for any reason, you need to be sure and pull the card from under the nose cone and let it dangle once again.
With enough monkeys with enough typewriters... That shit's gonna bite somebody sometime.
Dan disagrees with my revision to the system because he feels that during this scenario, if the card was hooked to the carabiner instead of stowed under the nose cone, the pilot would see it there when temporarily unhooking and would move it from the carabiner to the hanging position, so that when the pilot returned to re-hook in the card would be dangling. He feels there is a very high rate of unhooked launches due to being hooked in and then unhooking temporarily and then forgetting to re-hook in when launching.
Oh. He FEELS that?
Luen Miller - 1994/09

The second pilot was distracted by backing off launch to get his helmet, which he had forgotten. While doing so he thought of a pilot who launched unhooked at Lookout Mountain as a result of the distraction of retrieving his helmet. Our pilot then proceeded to launch unhooked.
Any of you Arizona guys capable of READING anything? That's probably THE classic unhooked launch scenario.
This is a good point and something you should consider when deciding whether to attach the final checklist to the nose of the glider or to the carabiner.
How 'bout we skip on down to:
A lot of pilots will...
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...pick up the glider, until they feel the tension on their, leg loops, to be sure those leg loops are attached.
But we're not gonna do that, are we? 'Cause we've put all this thought and work into this clever little checklist approach that's making us famous and popular. And if we do what "a lot of pilots" do even once then all that effort goes down the toilet.
Oh, before I forget...
Did you consult a checklist card to keep you from forgetting?
2 important things about the contents of the 2 checklists:
1) Ensure that the first item on the Final Checklist card is "Pre-Flight Checklist Completed" or something like that.
If you need to read that on a card to remember whether or not you've run your preflight is it really a good idea to continue on towards the ramp?
2) Ensure that one of the items on the Pre-Flight Checklist is "Final Checklist Card is Dangling from the Glider" or something like that.
Ensure that you don't forget to do that. Maybe create a checklist for ensuring that you have all the boxes checked for your two checklist cards.
In summary, having the checklist anywhere that works for the pilot is much better than no checklist at all....
Says who? Based upon what data?
...the idea is to find a method that ensures the pilot is reminded to use the card on every flight.
Thanks bigtime. But my idea is to think within two seconds of commitment about the likely consequences of an unhooked launch. I really don't need or want the distraction of trying to remember whether or not I've used my card to verify that my helmet is buckled at that point.
Dan feels strongly that he has investigated all the options over many years and the carabiner clip method is the most fool proof.
Let's nominate him for a u$hPa Exceptional Service Award.
I gave all the detail above because I want everyone to know the thought process...
And lack thereof.
...behind this checklist system, so they could consider those points as they decide what works best for them.
Fuck that. Top notch XC pilots will fly tasks for four hours and land within seconds and yards of each other 'cause they're all doing what works best PERIOD. There are no "works best for" various individuals in aviation. You do Standard Operating Procedures for EVERYONE. Well, yeah, not everyone can do lift and tug on his particular glider/harness combo in all circumstances. But everybody can do some reasonable approximation. And THIS:

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=31781
Another hang check lesson
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http://www.energykitesystems.net/Lift/hgh/TadEareckson/FTHI.pdf

WILL work for everyone and is as bulletproof a strategy as we're ever gonna get.
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