parachutes

General discussion about the sport of hang gliding
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Tad Eareckson
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Re: parachutes

Post by Tad Eareckson »

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=33438
Accident in France
Tigouille - 2015/09/24 13:17:25 UTC
Limoges

Good pilots are not all good acro pilots (I don't know about Thibault), but it was a windy day. I am not qualified to judge how that would affect acro perf and possibilities. Not sure throwing the chute is the basic issue here (as it is for Wolfi).
David-CH - 2015/09/24 14:44:15 UTC
Lausanne

You're right, Sunday was a windy and turbulent day with "bise" wind. All PG flights were cancelled and almost all HG pilots decided not to fly this day. Only two pilots took off and Thibault was one of them. I was quite upset seeing them in flight in those conditions, and of course even more after seeing this terrible accident happen ! Thibault was over the valley when his wing tumbled, where the wind and turbulences should be lighter... It's hard to say if that was the main cause of his accident but it's of course one of them.
Aaron Swepston - 2015/09/24 16:03:15 UTC

Aerobatics in a hang glider are not approved or condoned by HG manufacturers because the risk involved is substantially higher than normal flying. Flying a hang glider within the placarded limits is bad enough; flinging them around aerobatically is something altogether different.

The problem with aerobatics is not when they are done well and done properly, because properly executed aerobatics are good, fun, sweet, and not damaging to our wings. However, it is when they are not done properly that is the most sinister problem. The sudden realization that this shit really is dangerous is a realization that nobody should ever experience. Knowledge and experience is priceless and truly a matter of life and death. The hardest part about teaching or coaching aerobatics is instilling the idea that there is little room for mistakes, and so it is extremely important to strive for perfection in all efforts. Things really can go from just fine, to really, really bad in the blink of an eye. Done well, learned well, practiced well, it can be great fun and relatively safe, but the sudden consequences of a mistake can be horrendous.

Not everyone learns with that full understanding of the relationship between accuracy and consequence.

A blown maneuver can kill you. Even if you have multiple reserve chutes. Preparing for the worst case scenario with backup after backup is no substitute for absolute preparation and a dedication to prevent that worse case scenario. The best cure is prevention. It seems simple and stupid, but the best way to avoid getting hurt or killed doing aero, if you insist on doing aero, is to not screw up. Don't do it. Don't screw up, because the results can be really bad. And if you're doing aero and don't really know how to avoid screwing up, then perhaps it would be wise to back off and get some outside help on how to know such things.
Aaron Swepston - 2015/09/24 16:34:57 UTC
Tigouille - 2015/09/24 13:17:25 UTC

Good pilots are not all good acro pilots...
Very good! I was hoping someone would make that point. While it is good to understand proper deployment practice, the bigger issue here is avoiding the necessity to throw that reserve. This was an aerobatic incident, a voluntary and pilot induced event. It did not "happen" to him because of outside influences, he tossed his glider into a vertical stall and tumbled out of the failed maneuver and broke up. Sure, let's not ignore proper reserve criteria, but let's also not ignore the cause of the accident. He would never have needed one, two, or three reserves had he not tail slid his glider. Let's not excuse sloppy flying technique. Let's not excuse poor judgment. Let's not excuse or ignore the creeping complacency that is infecting our sport more now than ever in recent history.

The recent fatality report demonstrates a trend, and ignoring that trend, or simply being blind to it, is our biggest problem right now. Not the number of reserves we have. Not how long we wait to toss it. Do the research, examine the reports objectively. Look around at all of our flying sites and compare one another's flying skills with the Pilot Proficiency System's requirements. The answers are there right in front of us, but a lot of us are simply too habituated to see.
Aaron Swepston - 2015/09/24 16:03:15 UTC

Aerobatics in a hang glider are not approved or condoned by HG manufacturers because the risk involved is substantially higher than normal flying.
Approved means certified.
Flying a hang glider within the placarded limits is bad enough; flinging them around aerobatically is something altogether different.
Like THIS:

http://forum.hanggliding.org/download/file.php?id=18967
Image

maybe? Are hang gliders placarded to be stood on their tails by a "pilot" who goes upright and takes his hands off the control bar and places them way the fuck up on the downtubes a foot or two off the deck?

How 'bout?:

http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7200/14097626583_03972773c6_o.png
Image

Does that asshole have the speed range for which that glider was certified?
The problem with aerobatics is not when they are done well and done properly, because properly executed aerobatics are good, fun, sweet, and not damaging to our wings. However, it is when they are not done properly that is the most sinister problem. The sudden realization that this shit really is dangerous is a realization that nobody should ever experience. Knowledge and experience is priceless and truly a matter of life and death. The hardest part about teaching or coaching aerobatics is instilling the idea that there is little room for mistakes, and so it is extremely important to strive for perfection in all efforts. Things really can go from just fine, to really, really bad in the blink of an eye. Done well, learned well, practiced well, it can be great fun and relatively safe, but the sudden consequences of a mistake can be horrendous.
How 'bout imperfectly timed landing flares? Any fatalities ever associated with any of those?
Not everyone learns with that full understanding of the relationship between accuracy and consequence.

A blown maneuver can kill you. Even if you have multiple reserve chutes. Preparing for the worst case scenario with backup after backup is no substitute for absolute preparation and a dedication to prevent that worse case scenario. The best cure is prevention. It seems simple and stupid, but the best way to avoid getting hurt or killed doing aero, if you insist on doing aero, is to not screw up.
Yeah, I think I'd said something like that a couple days ago. And, go figure, I'm not even a beyond ninety aero guy.
Don't do it. Don't screw up, because the results can be really bad. And if you're doing aero and don't really know how to avoid screwing up, then perhaps it would be wise to back off and get some outside help on how to know such things.
Maybe Jim Keen-Intellect Rooney can run another twenty page Davis Show thread for us - do for aero what he did for foot landings and standard aerotow weak links.
Aaron Swepston - 2015/09/24 16:34:57 UTC

Sure, let's not ignore proper reserve criteria, but let's also not ignore the cause of the accident. He would never have needed one, two, or three reserves had he not tail slid his glider.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-bRrpHNa68iY/UQ6Pv9gRZyI/AAAAAAAAjTg/Hc22bx5122Q/s2048/20943781_BG1.jpg
Image
Let's not excuse sloppy flying technique. Let's not excuse poor judgment. Let's not excuse or ignore the creeping complacency that is infecting our sport more now than ever in recent history.
And...

http://www.hanggliding.org/viewtopic.php?t=14312
Tow Park accidents
Jack Axaopoulos - 2009/11/12 14:49:58 UTC

One of the stated goals of this site is to promote HG. MOST views on this site are NOT from members but from visitors, they have no ignore button.

Having Tad run around every day giving the impression that there is a massive weekly slaughter of pilots at tow parks due to their horribly dangerous devices surely doesnt promote HG. Especially when the safety records are quite excellent.

Like Jim said, theyve gone a decade with no fatalities at their tow park. Pretty damn good I say.

Yet listening to Tad, you would think guys were dying all over the place
He's been nothing but misleading and negative and ignored multiple warnings from me. So He's GONE
...who's responsible for that?
The recent fatality report demonstrates a trend...
What recent fatality report? All we have is a mainstream media report and a few posts. No internal investigation, wing camera video, track log.

We have ten fatal crashes with eleven kills so far this year and little more than total shit in the way of reports.
...and ignoring that trend, or simply being blind to it, is our biggest problem right now.
As opposed to WHEN?
Not the number of reserves we have. Not how long we wait to toss it. Do the research, examine the reports objectively.
Yeah, read the Kelly Harrison / Arys Moorhead - or whatever you can get of it through the privileged information decimators.
Look around at all of our flying sites and compare one another's flying skills with the Pilot Proficiency System's requirements.
- Seeing as how Mark G. Forbes has openly stated that u$hPa will NEVER allow an actual fix to an actual problem into its SOPs, just how much faith should we have in the legitimacy of the Pilot Proficiency System's requirements?

- How 'bout this one:
With each flight, demonstrates a method of establishing that the pilot is hooked in just prior to launch.
What percentage of flyers are making the slightest pretense of compliance? And just how much help have we gotten from you in pushing it?
The answers are there right in front of us, but a lot of us are simply too habituated to see.
Habituated? All of the most effective, obvious, easiest, biggest bang for the buck fixes and their advocates are under nonstop attack coordinated from the top. And we have better things to worry about than guys blowing aerobatics in smooth air and/or having them blown in turbulence.
Aaron Swepston - 2015/09/25 14:33:14 UTC

This kind of situation is always so tragic and sad because these specific kinds of events are preventable, or avoidable.
If I have to feel for people I'm gonna prioritize the ones who were victims of their instructors.
I'm also struck by the pilot's age; only thirty years old. That's not very old at all, he was just a kid. I've been looping longer than he was on this earth, and it always hits me hardest when something like this happens unnecessarily.
So where are ya on Bertrand Delacroix? He spun in on an aircraft that appeared to be for recreational purposes having done nothing wrong a bit over three months ago and we don't have one word - even an acknowledgement that anything happened - from the motherfuckers who launched him on the other side of the road.
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<BS>
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Re: parachutes

Post by <BS> »

Tad Eareckson wrote:The concept of using a bigger chute and a longer bridle is the correct approach for minimizing shock loading. But then you have to figure out how to get yourself into an Adam Parer situation to justify the extra weight you'll hafta carry around on all the flights you don't get yourself into an Adam Parer situation and hope you don't get yourself into a low altitude situation in which you need to stop on a dime.
Better fix the harness first. He barely got out the chute he had.
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Tad Eareckson
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Re: parachutes

Post by Tad Eareckson »

Whatever solution you come up with won't work. If it would then everybody would be using it already. And besides, the first hundred people to use it would be test pilots. And Jim Keen-Intellect Rooney doesn't like test pilots and won't tow them.

http://www.chgpa.org/forums/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=939
Weak link breaks?
Jim Rooney - 2005/08/31 23:46:25 UTC

As with many changes in avaition, change is approached with a bit of skepticism. Rightfully so. There's something to be said for "tried and true" methods... by strapping on somehting new, you become a test pilot. The unknown and unforseen become your greatest risk factors. It's up to each of us to individually asses the risks/rewards for ourselves.
http://ozreport.com/docs/AdamParerAccidentReport.pdf
ACCIDENT REPORT
Adam Parer - 2009/11/25

INJURIES
- Flail fracture of the chest (RHS)
- 6 broken ribs
- Fractured sternum
- Punctured right lung
- Spontaneous pneumothorax (Collapsed right lung)
- Bruising under the armpits
- Very minor grazing to right cheek
- Haematoma of the eyes
There's a lot to be said for "tried and true" methods. That's my assesment anyway.
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Tad Eareckson
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Re: parachutes

Post by Tad Eareckson »

http://ozreport.com/2.021
Jim Zeiset's Report on Brad Koji
Davis Straub

The following is Jim Zeiset's report on Brad Koji's death. I have added a few clarifications. It is not an official USHGA report and is only presented here as the best information that we presently have regarding the causes of this death.
On June 6, 1998 at approximately 5:00 PM (1998/06/06 17:00) Brad Koji was thermaling 4 miles Southeast of Lamy, New Mexico at about 10,000 feet. This altitude was the top of a rather pronounced inversion. The wind was Southeast at 15 below and Northwest at about 20 above. Brad's superior thermaling skills allowed him to reach this violent mixing zone while most others could not. Once in this layer of air his Laminar ST 14 pitched over into a symmetrical tuck and probable tumble.

Both leading edges failed inboard of the leading edge crossbar junction sleeve under negative load. (A negative load means that the force vector was directed from the top surface toward the bottom surface of the glider.) The keel failed under negative load forward of the rear flying wire set sleeve and the keel stinger broke aft of the rear wire set sleeve most likely on landing.

The washout struts were bent down in plastic deformation about 15 degrees. The crossbar-leading edge mounting hardware was twisted negatively on both sides. The frame failures were symmetrical. The sail was torn from the trailing edge forward to the crossbar on either side of the keel and those tears were also symmetrical.

What this means is, that while the leading edges outboard of the crossbar junction were bent down by a negative load (pitching over), the leading edges inboard of the crossbar junction were deflected upwards. The pitchover itself was likely exacerbated by the lower effectiveness of the bent leading edge sprog positions. In fact, the new position of the sprog would be the equivalent of installing about 10 extra washers under the sprog at the leading edge mounting point.

In addition, negative loading on the sprogs produced a large upwards force on the forward leading edge due to a roughly 5 to one lever arm over the crossbar. The combination of these two forces resulted in catastrophic failure of the leading edges inboard of the crossbar junction sleeve.

How a pilot tunes his glider will often effect its dynamic stability. In this case, the VG setting was off, hang point was 1 hole aft of center, sprog setting was 3 washers right side and 2 washers left side and the airfoil was the DHV certified No. 8 batten pattern. The washout tube slots were not filed to allow a lowered setting. All of these possible tuning elements were within factory specifications.

The lower ten feet of the parachute bridle cord showed signs of melting on the surface. This was most likely caused by friction of the bridle cord pulling tight around the pilot and glider as the parachute opened. This adds credence to the theory that the glider tumbled multiple times winding the parachute bridle around the pilot/glider assembly.

Brad's parachute bridle was attached to his harness behind his neck. Brad had attached it this way in order to assure a feet down landing in the event of a deployment. Attaching the bridle in this manner will allow for the glider to hit the ground before the pilot reducing the load on the descending parachute by 100 lbs. and allowing the pilot to land at an even slower speed. (It also is thought to reduce drag by eliminating the bridle run to the carabiner.)

It is reasonable to believe that the pilot and glider would attain speeds of about 50 miles per hour and that opening shock would reduce that speed to about 20 miles per hour in about 1.5 seconds. The pilot would experience at least a 3 G deceleration.

The pathologist with the Albuquerque Medical Examiners office who performed the autopsy of Brad said, "The cause of death was the bridle chord for the parachute wrapped around his body or neck during the deployment sequence and when the parachute opened the bridle pulled tight around his neck causing two vertebrae to separate by approximately 1 inch severing the spinal chord. Death was instantaneous."
Brad's superior thermaling skills allowed him to reach this violent mixing zone while most others could not.
I don't believe much in "superior thermaling skills".
(A negative load means that the force vector was directed from the top surface toward the bottom surface of the glider.)
As opposed to being directed from the top surface and redirected out the port wingtip.
How a pilot tunes his glider will often effect...
Affect.
(It also is thought to reduce drag by eliminating the bridle run to the carabiner.)
Wow. Take something out of the airflow and it's thought to reduce drag. Who'd have ever thought that?!
"The cause of death was the bridle chord...
Bridle CORD. Actually... A deployed parachute doesn't have a bridle, bridle chords, cords. It has a LEADER.
Image
Note the full face helmet (looks like the Uvex I flew for all of my later career) is gonna greatly facilitate the leader fouling around the pilot's neck.
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Tad Eareckson
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Re: parachutes

Post by Tad Eareckson »

http://www.shga.com/forum/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=5871
Accidental Deployment
Jim Thompson - 2018/05/06 06:54:41 UTC

The pilot experiencing an accidental deployment of a reserve 'chute on Saturday may choose to post details but for those who are wondering...

A pilot reported on the radio that a glider was under canopy to the east of Trash. The glider reportedly impacted on the steep slope on the east face. No one could confirm movement. LACoFD Rescue was called from the LZ. Thirty minutes later, a helicopter responded. Almost all pilots had landed in anticipation of the rescue operation. The fire crew retireved the pilot and flew off in the direction of Whiteman Airport. The group present in the LZ was eventually informed that the pilot was fine (applause and sighs of relief!) and SHGA members picked up and returned the pilot to the LZ.

At the LZ, the pilot reported hearing a 'pop' and reached back to find the parachute case had opened. Unable to contain the deployment bag, the 'chute dropped out and deployed. The glider impacted in a very steep section that the pilot, after struggling to exit the harness, felt was too dangerous to try to climb up or down. The pilot reported waving at pilots in the air above but, apparently, no one was close enough to see.

The glider sustained damage against rocky terrain from the helicopter wash and remains on the mountain at this writing.

And I was already thinking it's time for a repack.
http://ozreport.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=24846
Is this a joke ?
Jim Rooney - 2011/09/02 23:09:12 UTC

Yeah, damn those pesky safety devices!
Remember kids, always blame the equipment.
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